宋瑛 陳紀(jì)平
摘要 資源詛咒現(xiàn)象形成的主要機制是,優(yōu)良的自然資源稟賦通過降低市場制度效率、扭曲經(jīng)濟正常結(jié)構(gòu)和提升市場信息成本三個渠道降低經(jīng)濟系統(tǒng)的投入-產(chǎn)出效率,最終影響長期經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平。這三個機制順利實現(xiàn)的前提條件是市場行為支配著資源流動結(jié)構(gòu),而這一條件在我國仍需要檢驗,政府主導(dǎo)是我國經(jīng)濟增長中的顯著特征,因此資源稟賦影響經(jīng)濟增長的性質(zhì)需要在考慮政府作用條件下進行解釋。地方政府影響經(jīng)濟具有嚴(yán)格的區(qū)域性,因此資源詛咒性質(zhì)的區(qū)域內(nèi)外是否一致是政府主導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟是否顯著的重要表現(xiàn),基于此本文區(qū)分行政區(qū)域和經(jīng)濟區(qū)域,利用勞動生產(chǎn)率和資源稟賦之間的統(tǒng)計關(guān)系來判定我國“資源詛咒”的存在性及其性質(zhì),并從經(jīng)濟制度角度對其進行解釋。首先,利用Malmquist指數(shù)方法對我國2000-2010年省際經(jīng)濟增長的經(jīng)濟效率分解并作為經(jīng)濟增長的質(zhì)量指標(biāo),同時為避免變量的“內(nèi)生性問題”而采用采礦業(yè)就業(yè)人數(shù)占總?cè)丝诒壤攘扛魇〉馁Y源豐裕度??刂平?jīng)濟區(qū)位后的計量回歸結(jié)果表明:各省份自然資源對各種經(jīng)濟效率均有正向作用,但是各省份相鄰區(qū)域的自然資源稟賦對于具體省份經(jīng)濟效率并無影響,經(jīng)濟區(qū)位對于各省份技術(shù)進步和整體經(jīng)濟效率的影響顯著,但對于各省份技術(shù)使用效率并不存在顯著影響,各省份自身制度效率受資源豐裕度、相鄰地區(qū)資源豐裕度、經(jīng)濟區(qū)位的影響不顯著。制度分析表明:政府主導(dǎo)和區(qū)域市場分割構(gòu)成我國經(jīng)濟增長體制環(huán)境的典型特征,這種體制中地方政府的效率是決定區(qū)域經(jīng)濟增長效率的重要因素。在這種制度環(huán)境中,自然資源通過影響地方政府對經(jīng)濟干預(yù)力度來影響經(jīng)濟增長效率形成“資源福祉”現(xiàn)象,并且由于地方政府主導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟的區(qū)域性和政府之間經(jīng)濟角色的競爭關(guān)系性質(zhì),這種“資源福祉”被嚴(yán)格限定在行政區(qū)域內(nèi)。
關(guān)鍵詞 政府主導(dǎo);市場分割;資源詛咒;經(jīng)濟效率
中圖分類號 F062.1 文獻標(biāo)識碼 A
文章編號 1002-2104(2014)09-0156-07
資源型經(jīng)濟的轉(zhuǎn)型是我國可持續(xù)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略中重要的環(huán)節(jié)之一,而明確資源稟賦影響區(qū)域經(jīng)濟增長的性質(zhì)并厘清其中的作用機制,對提高轉(zhuǎn)型政策的針對性和有效性具有現(xiàn)實意義?!百Y源詛咒”是主流經(jīng)濟學(xué)關(guān)于資源稟賦和經(jīng)濟增長之間關(guān)系的重要統(tǒng)計規(guī)律和經(jīng)濟原理,“資源詛咒”現(xiàn)象的作用機制本質(zhì)上是自然資源稟賦通過影響經(jīng)濟效率作用于經(jīng)濟發(fā)展進程。經(jīng)濟研究文獻中關(guān)于資源詛咒的機制主要有六種:初級產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易條件逐漸惡化的長期趨勢[1-2]、資源行業(yè)收益的波動造成公共管理與企業(yè)管理效率低下[3]、“荷蘭病”機制[4]、擠出效應(yīng)[5]、政府干預(yù)增多和效率降低[6]、社會、文化與政治影響[7]。六個機制中,優(yōu)良的自然資源稟賦通過降低市場制度效率、扭曲經(jīng)濟正常結(jié)構(gòu)和提升市場信息成本三個渠道降低經(jīng)濟系統(tǒng)的投入-產(chǎn)出效率,最終影響長期經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平。然而這一規(guī)律和原理主要是基于西方發(fā)達(dá)市場經(jīng)濟經(jīng)驗形成的,上述機制順利實現(xiàn)的前提條件是市場行為支配著資源流動結(jié)構(gòu),其所依賴的成熟市場體制條件在我國并不完全具備。我國改革開放以來的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展特點就是市場經(jīng)濟體制完善與經(jīng)濟增長并行,即所謂漸進式改革,因此分析我國自然資源與經(jīng)濟增長之間的關(guān)系必須在重新審視經(jīng)濟制度的前提下進行。
基于此,本文的工作是測算我國省際經(jīng)濟增長效率,然后統(tǒng)計分析資源稟賦與區(qū)域經(jīng)濟效率之間的關(guān)系,以此檢驗我國經(jīng)濟中是否存在“資源詛咒”。如果“資源詛咒”現(xiàn)象不存在,依據(jù)我國市場制度結(jié)構(gòu)給出相應(yīng)解釋。文章的結(jié)構(gòu)為:第一部分對我國相關(guān)研究成果進行梳理及評述;第二部分介紹效率核算的Malmquist方法、處理相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)并分解2000-2010年我國省級經(jīng)濟增長效率;第三部分在控制經(jīng)濟區(qū)位基礎(chǔ)上對經(jīng)濟效率和經(jīng)濟增長及其速度之間關(guān)系進行實證分析;第四部分從經(jīng)濟體制角度解釋回歸結(jié)果;第五部分對全文進行總結(jié)。
1 研究背景
“資源詛咒”(resource curse)概念最先來自于Auty,指自然資源豐富的區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展相對滯后的統(tǒng)計現(xiàn)象[8]。沿著驗證與解釋“資源詛咒”現(xiàn)象兩條主線,經(jīng)濟學(xué)界形成大量的研究文獻,其中大部分都是跨國角度的實證分析,直到Papyrakis和Gerlagh基于美國州際截面數(shù)據(jù)的相對收斂性檢驗分析,相關(guān)研究開始延伸到同一國家內(nèi)的不同地區(qū)[9]。如此背景下,關(guān)于我國自然資源稟賦影響經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的研究工作近年來也逐步展開,前期形成的文獻基本上都認(rèn)為我國經(jīng)濟中存在著“資源詛咒”[10-14] ,近期一些學(xué)者在修正研究指標(biāo)與方法基礎(chǔ)上則得出相反的結(jié)論:或者發(fā)現(xiàn)不同時期資源豐裕度對區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的影響性質(zhì)不一致[15],或者認(rèn)為我國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中不存在顯著的“資源詛咒”現(xiàn)象[16-17]。
上述兩種結(jié)論相反的研究工作最重要的差別是資源豐裕度指標(biāo)不同。認(rèn)為我國經(jīng)濟明顯存在“資源詛咒”的文獻都采用了某個采掘業(yè)規(guī)模指標(biāo)占經(jīng)濟總量指標(biāo)的比例來衡量資源豐裕度,例如采礦業(yè)固定資產(chǎn)投資占各省份固定資產(chǎn)投資總額的比重[10,12],采礦業(yè)職工收入占總體職工收入比例[11],能源工業(yè)產(chǎn)值占工業(yè)總產(chǎn)值比重[13],以及采礦業(yè)從業(yè)人員占從業(yè)人員總數(shù)的比重[14]。然而此類指標(biāo)存在著工具變量“內(nèi)生性”問題,即使資源稟賦不變,經(jīng)濟增長也會改變度量指標(biāo),從而作為因變量的GDP增長越慢,該地區(qū)就越傾向于被“度量”成資源豐富區(qū)域[17]。為了克服這種工具變量的“內(nèi)生性”問題,采掘業(yè)從業(yè)人數(shù)和當(dāng)?shù)厝丝跀?shù)的比重被引入作為度量區(qū)域資源豐裕度的工具變量,并得出了不同的結(jié)論。
在克服了解釋變量的“內(nèi)生性”問題后,已有研究仍然存在兩個問題:一是非資源因素對經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平的影響難以完全剔除,二是以市場有效為前提條件,未能考慮到政府行為對區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的影響。首先,由于經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平是一個多種因素共同影響的結(jié)果,因此相關(guān)研究在實證分析時盡量剔除掉其他因素的影響,包括區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展基礎(chǔ)、物質(zhì)資本與人力資本存量水平、勞動力投入、科技投入與區(qū)位等等,所采取的方法是在回歸模型中加入這些變量。然而影響經(jīng)濟發(fā)展因素之間往往存在系統(tǒng)性問題(類似計量中的協(xié)整關(guān)系),同時制度類變量也難以準(zhǔn)確量化,導(dǎo)致統(tǒng)計分析結(jié)果不穩(wěn)定。同時,自然資源“詛咒”經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的機制是吸引經(jīng)濟要素過度投入資源產(chǎn)業(yè)而制約了制造業(yè)發(fā)展,而后者具有巨大外部性和顯著“干中學(xué)”效應(yīng),從而導(dǎo)致總體經(jīng)濟效率降低,這一機制運行的前提條件是要素市場較為完善且政府行為會強化(至少不會弱化)此機制,但是我國政府在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中發(fā)揮重要作用且市場制度仍處在建設(shè)與完善過程當(dāng)中[18],未考慮這一現(xiàn)實背景的研究結(jié)論可靠性難以保證。
綜上,研究當(dāng)前我國經(jīng)濟中自然資源稟賦對區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的影響性質(zhì),必需在利用已有研究消除解釋變量內(nèi)生性問題的基礎(chǔ)上,恰當(dāng)剔除其他因素對經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平的影響并考慮市場制度的效率條件。
2.2 數(shù)據(jù)處理
根據(jù)統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)狀況,本文擬對2000-2010年我國大陸地區(qū)31個省、市、自治區(qū)的經(jīng)濟效率進行Malmquist指數(shù)分解。由前述模型介紹可知,效率核算需要各年度資本存量(k)、勞動投入(l)和產(chǎn)出水平(p)。其中勞動投入直接采用2001-2011各年度《中國統(tǒng)計年鑒》中“各地區(qū)按三次產(chǎn)業(yè)分就業(yè)人員數(shù)年底數(shù)”相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù);產(chǎn)出水平則使用各年度不變價格的地區(qū)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)指標(biāo),具體核算方式為:以2000年各?。ㄊ小⒆灾螀^(qū))GDP為基礎(chǔ),然后使用各年度GDP指數(shù)進行核算并獲得后續(xù)各年的地區(qū)生產(chǎn)總值(2000年價格水平),所有原始數(shù)據(jù)同樣來自2001-2011各年度《中國統(tǒng)計年鑒》。
資本存量則基于永續(xù)盤存法原理進行核算,具體核算公式如下:
K(t)=K(0)+∑t[]i=1[I(i)-d(i)]/P(i)(3)
其中K(0)、I(i)、d(i)和P(i)分別表示基期的資本存量、時期i的投資水平、時期i的固定資產(chǎn)折舊水平和時期i的固定資產(chǎn)價格平減指數(shù)。本文以年為時期跨度,除基期(2000年)的資本存量需要核算之外,其余數(shù)據(jù)均直接來自2001-2011各年《中國統(tǒng)計年鑒》相應(yīng)指標(biāo):投資水平采用“各地區(qū)資本形成總額及構(gòu)成”表中的“固定資本形成總額”指標(biāo)數(shù)據(jù),折舊采用“地區(qū)生產(chǎn)總值收入法構(gòu)成項目”表中的“固定資產(chǎn)折舊”指標(biāo)數(shù)據(jù),固定資產(chǎn)價格平減指數(shù)采用“各地區(qū)固定資產(chǎn)投資價格指數(shù)”。
基期(2000年)的資本存量依據(jù)“資本產(chǎn)出比率恒定屬于經(jīng)濟增長程式化事實(stylized facts)”規(guī)律進行核算。首先計算2000到2010年投資總量和總產(chǎn)出增量(地區(qū)生產(chǎn)總值增量),其次用這兩個結(jié)果計算不同區(qū)域的資本產(chǎn)出比率,最后結(jié)合2000年各省(市、自治區(qū))的地區(qū)生產(chǎn)總值計算當(dāng)年的資本存量水平。
2.3 效率分解核算
這一部分基于前述數(shù)據(jù)處理結(jié)果和公式(3)、(4)所示的經(jīng)濟效率分解原理,利用DEAP2.1軟件對2000-2010年我國大陸地區(qū)各?。ㄊ小⒆灾螀^(qū))的經(jīng)濟效率進行分解核算。分解結(jié)果表明,21世紀(jì)頭十年我國高速經(jīng)濟增長中,經(jīng)濟效率提高的貢獻份額很低:和12.4%的全國平均經(jīng)濟增長水平相比,經(jīng)濟效率僅僅提高1.9%。同時,經(jīng)濟效率的提高主要體現(xiàn)為技術(shù)進步:在經(jīng)濟效率進步(年均1.9%)中,技術(shù)進步占據(jù)了主要部分(年均1.6%)。
3 資源豐裕度對經(jīng)濟效率影響實證分析
3.1 指標(biāo)與數(shù)據(jù)說明
這一部分考察各省份經(jīng)濟增長效率對資源豐裕程度的數(shù)量依賴關(guān)系,其中效率指標(biāo)使用前一部分分解的結(jié)果,其余指標(biāo)與數(shù)據(jù)處理方法如下:
(1)資源豐裕度。選擇采掘業(yè)就業(yè)人員數(shù)量與總?cè)丝诘谋戎底鳛楣ぞ咦兞窟M行區(qū)域資源豐裕度的測度。具體測度指標(biāo)采用2001-2011年《中國統(tǒng)計年鑒》相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)進行核算,其中就業(yè)人員數(shù)采取“各地區(qū)按行業(yè)分城鎮(zhèn)單位就業(yè)人員數(shù)(年底數(shù))”中的采礦業(yè)數(shù)據(jù),總?cè)丝诳趶綖椤案鞯貐^(qū)年末總?cè)丝凇保瑑烧叩谋戎翟?000-2010年的平均水平即為各個省份的資源豐裕度。為了消除經(jīng)濟周期對指標(biāo)度量效率的影響,資源豐裕度采取了各省(市、自治區(qū))2000-2010年相應(yīng)指標(biāo)的平均值。
(2)相鄰區(qū)域資源豐裕度。由于國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟環(huán)境中區(qū)域經(jīng)濟活動之間具有比國際環(huán)境更強烈的空間相關(guān)特性,因此必須考慮具體省份經(jīng)濟增長遭受其相鄰區(qū)域“資源詛咒”的可能性。同時出于判斷地方政府行為主導(dǎo)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟增長效率力度的需要,本文引入相鄰區(qū)域資源豐裕度指標(biāo)并估計其對區(qū)域經(jīng)濟增長的影響性質(zhì)。相鄰區(qū)域資源豐裕度是具體省份相鄰的省份資源豐裕度指標(biāo)的平均值,具體數(shù)據(jù)處理方法為:
NZY=wZY(4)
其中:NZY為相鄰區(qū)域資源豐裕度數(shù)據(jù)向量;w為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的空間權(quán)重矩陣;
ZY為各省份的資源豐裕度數(shù)據(jù)向量。
空間權(quán)重矩陣建立方法:相鄰省份賦值為1,否則為零。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化方法:用矩陣每行元素之和除其中每個元素值,結(jié)果是每行(列)元素和等于1。
(3)制度效率指標(biāo)。本文基于世界銀行的政府效率(government effectiveness)測度數(shù)據(jù)來計算各省份的制度質(zhì)量。由于制度變遷具有漸進特征,因此2006年數(shù)據(jù)在時效性上是可行的。World Bank(2006)基于國有-私有產(chǎn)權(quán)范圍、稅費負(fù)擔(dān)、勞動力冗余等指標(biāo)計算出了政府服務(wù)于國內(nèi)企業(yè)的效率指數(shù)值[22]。這些指數(shù)是針對120個樣本城市計算的,本文將各省份的城市指數(shù)進行平均,結(jié)果作為各?。ㄊ?、自治區(qū))的制度質(zhì)量指數(shù)。因為西藏沒有城市進入樣本,因此將與其相鄰的青海省指標(biāo)作為西藏的制度質(zhì)量指數(shù)近似值。
從表1所示回歸結(jié)果可以得出以下結(jié)論:
第一,我國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展過程當(dāng)中,豐富的自然資源對于經(jīng)濟增長具有顯著的正向影響,而不是“資源詛咒”。在三個效率指標(biāo)作為因變量的回歸中,資源豐裕度ZY都通過0.05顯著水平的t檢驗,說明資源稟賦對于經(jīng)濟增長具有影響,這一點和馮宗憲、姜昕、王青[16]及方穎、紀(jì)衎、趙揚[17]使用經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平的分析結(jié)論不同;同時,ZY系數(shù)估計值均大于零,表明資源越豐富的區(qū)域經(jīng)濟效率越高,形成“資源福祉(resource blessing)”這一點不僅和“資源詛咒”經(jīng)典文獻不同,而且和大部分對我國“資源詛咒”的研究文獻結(jié)論也相反。
第二,資源影響經(jīng)濟增長的省際“擴散效應(yīng)”不顯著。在所有效率指標(biāo)作為因變量的回歸中,相鄰區(qū)域資源豐裕度NZY都未通過0.1顯著水平的t檢驗,說明相鄰區(qū)域資源稟賦對于經(jīng)濟增長不存在顯著影響,意味著即使在國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟環(huán)境中,我國經(jīng)濟區(qū)域之間的地理距離與經(jīng)濟距離存在較大差距。
第三,經(jīng)濟區(qū)位對于各省份技術(shù)使用效率不存在顯著影響。為解決日益擴大的區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展差距,我國在21世紀(jì)實施了西部大開發(fā)、振興中部等區(qū)域發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略,因此各省份的經(jīng)濟區(qū)位不僅包含國際貿(mào)易條件差異,而且包含了區(qū)域經(jīng)濟政策的不同。從表1看出,區(qū)位虛擬變量在技術(shù)使用效率的回歸中未能通過0.1顯著性水平的t檢驗,說明區(qū)位對于技術(shù)使用效率沒有明顯影響。技術(shù)使用效率主要取決于微觀層面的企業(yè)交易行為有效程度,而后者又主要決定于市場制度效率,說明經(jīng)濟區(qū)位對于各省份的市場效率影響不明顯。
第四,經(jīng)濟區(qū)位對于各省份技術(shù)進步和整體經(jīng)濟效率的影響顯著。與對技術(shù)使用效率的影響不同,區(qū)位對于技術(shù)進步以及總體經(jīng)濟效率的影響顯著:相應(yīng)回歸中的系數(shù)估計值均通過顯著性水平0.05的t檢驗,總體來看區(qū)域之間存在明顯的技術(shù)進步和總體經(jīng)濟效率差異。
第五,各省份自身制度效率受資源豐裕度、相鄰地區(qū)資源豐裕度、經(jīng)濟區(qū)位的影響不顯著。按照前述“資源詛咒”機制,自然資源豐富區(qū)域必然會因為政府過多干預(yù)市場、腐敗等行為而導(dǎo)致制度效率較低[6],但表1中回歸結(jié)果卻表明包括資源豐裕度等在內(nèi)的市場因素并沒有影響制度效率,說明市場因素未能主導(dǎo)制度效率。
4 資源-效率關(guān)系的制度解釋
這一部分將說明,第三部分我國資源稟賦對區(qū)域經(jīng)濟效率作用規(guī)律,是政府主導(dǎo)、市場分割經(jīng)濟增長體制中“資源詛咒”機制發(fā)生作用的特定后果。
4.1 經(jīng)濟增長制度背景
改革開放以來,盡管我國社會主義市場經(jīng)濟體制逐步建立并日益完善,然而政府在我國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中仍然起著主導(dǎo)作用。即使進入21世紀(jì),經(jīng)濟發(fā)展與運行當(dāng)中各級政府仍擁有過多的資源,而且繼續(xù)充當(dāng)?shù)胤浇?jīng)濟活動和資源配置的主角,嚴(yán)重抑制了市場在資源配置中基礎(chǔ)性作用的發(fā)揮,這一點已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟學(xué)家的共識[23-26]。
我國當(dāng)前政府主導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟活動的經(jīng)濟體制中,地方政府是核心主體。地方政府參與資源配置的方式和途徑主要包括五個。第一,以行政方式改變土地用途,包括低價向農(nóng)民征用土地、違法占地和隨意批租土地、低標(biāo)準(zhǔn)土地補償和拖欠征地補償費等;第二,審批項目,包括越權(quán)化整為零、違反環(huán)保等規(guī)定促成大項目上馬;第三,行政性市場控制,包括行政壟斷、限制競爭,甚至封鎖市場、強迫使用或消費本地生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品;第四,干預(yù)金融活動,進行信貸控制,例如迫使銀行等金融機構(gòu)為形象工程、政績工程提供貸款和信貸優(yōu)惠;第五,價格控制,對生產(chǎn)要素和重要資源產(chǎn)品進行價格管制、壓低價格,使市場信號嚴(yán)重扭曲;甚至還包括對計生委、婦聯(lián)等下達(dá)招商引資指標(biāo)等[27]。
政府主導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟活動的制度特征引導(dǎo)地方政府之間進行激烈的經(jīng)濟增長競爭,其結(jié)果是在我國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展進程中造成了嚴(yán)重的區(qū)域市場分割進而區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展差距。地方政府間競爭型的經(jīng)濟增長模式有兩個重要形成機制:第一,行政與財政分權(quán)的稅收激勵,導(dǎo)致地方政府實施具有濃重地方保護主義色彩的行政手段以促進經(jīng)濟增長,這種經(jīng)濟發(fā)展體制格局被稱為所謂“中國特色的聯(lián)邦主義”[28-29];第二,現(xiàn)行政府官員晉升機制作用下形成地方政府官員在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中采取區(qū)域競爭行為[30-31]。
總體來講,政府主導(dǎo)和區(qū)域市場分割構(gòu)成我國經(jīng)濟增長體制環(huán)境的典型特征,這種體制中地方政府的效率是決定區(qū)域經(jīng)濟增長效率的重要因素。當(dāng)前我國自然資源稟賦對于經(jīng)濟增長的影響也必然受制于這一體制環(huán)境。
4.2 制度背景的實證解釋
政府主導(dǎo)、市場分割的經(jīng)濟體制中,區(qū)域發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略會改變區(qū)域經(jīng)濟進步速率,但不會改變地方市場制度變遷效率。改革開放以來我國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展在總體上存在明顯的區(qū)域差異性:改革開放之初,我國便實行了非均衡的區(qū)域發(fā)展政策,近年來又分東、中、西、東北部實施了區(qū)域發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略。這些區(qū)域發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略主要是土地、資金和稅收等優(yōu)惠政策,這些優(yōu)惠政策無疑會改變不同區(qū)域的產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)進而改變其技術(shù)進步速率。由于當(dāng)前我國經(jīng)濟增長效率主要是技術(shù)進步率,從而整體經(jīng)濟效率也會受到這些優(yōu)惠政策的影響。然而,在地方政府主導(dǎo)、市場分割的制度條件下,這些優(yōu)惠政策對各省份內(nèi)部的制度效率不會起到顯著作用。
三個效率指標(biāo)中,技術(shù)使用效率、技術(shù)進步率分別反映了基礎(chǔ)制度效率和純技術(shù)投入-產(chǎn)出效率[20],因此可以預(yù)測,區(qū)域戰(zhàn)略改變不會改變市場制度但會改變區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的產(chǎn)業(yè)和技術(shù)結(jié)構(gòu)。這些經(jīng)濟效率的區(qū)域性質(zhì)在第三部分的回歸分析中得到驗證:區(qū)域間不存在明顯的技術(shù)使用效率差異,但技術(shù)進步率和整體經(jīng)濟效率卻差別顯著。由此同時,反映政府行政效率的制度效率變量也不存在明顯的區(qū)域差別,間接支持了上述結(jié)論。
4.3 “資源福祉”的作用機制
和制造業(yè)等其他產(chǎn)業(yè)相比較,資源產(chǎn)業(yè)具有較強的規(guī)模經(jīng)濟,對市場規(guī)模的依賴較大,在理想的有效市場條件下資源產(chǎn)業(yè)與其他產(chǎn)業(yè)的效率應(yīng)該無差異;但是在市場效率普遍較低的環(huán)境當(dāng)中,資源產(chǎn)業(yè)效率下降要比其他產(chǎn)業(yè)劇烈的多,當(dāng)政府干預(yù)經(jīng)濟增長時,資源產(chǎn)業(yè)所帶來的效率損失較其他產(chǎn)業(yè)小。以市場主導(dǎo)的經(jīng)濟增長模式相比較,當(dāng)前我國政府主導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟增長模式的經(jīng)濟效率普遍不高,這一點在我國當(dāng)前政府主導(dǎo)、市場效率不高經(jīng)濟環(huán)境下,使得資源產(chǎn)業(yè)的效率距離理想市場條件下效率更為接近,從而使得自然資源稟賦更好、資源產(chǎn)業(yè)份額更高區(qū)域的整體經(jīng)濟效率高于其他地區(qū),在統(tǒng)計上表現(xiàn)為經(jīng)濟效率對資源豐裕度的正向數(shù)量依賴關(guān)系。也就是說,較高的自然資源稟賦不但沒有對區(qū)域經(jīng)濟構(gòu)成“資源詛咒(resource curse)”,反而成為其經(jīng)濟增長的“福祉(resource blessing)”而不是“資源詛咒”。
與此相互印證的一個結(jié)果是,在政府主導(dǎo)、市場分割體制中,資源稟賦對于經(jīng)濟效率的影響被局限在行政區(qū)域之內(nèi)。第三部分實證分析中相鄰區(qū)域自然資源稟賦對具體省份經(jīng)濟效率無顯著影響,“資源詛咒”的經(jīng)濟范圍由行政范圍替代,意味著資源稟賦是通過影響地方政府行為最終作用于經(jīng)濟增長效率的。其機制在于,市場主導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟運行環(huán)境中,豐富的自然資源會通過要素集中、要素價格升高、匯率上升等途徑影響統(tǒng)一市場內(nèi)部的其他產(chǎn)業(yè)效率,即“荷蘭病”與“擠出效應(yīng)”機制。
5 結(jié) 語
本文從經(jīng)濟效率視角分析我國“資源詛咒”的存在性及其性質(zhì),并從經(jīng)濟制度角度對其進行解釋。鑒于許多影響經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平的因素難以準(zhǔn)確計量,同時自然資源稟賦在本質(zhì)上是通過影響經(jīng)濟效率而作用于經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平的,本文首先利用Malmquist指數(shù)對我國2000-2010年省際經(jīng)濟增長的效率進行分解,然后采用采礦業(yè)就業(yè)人口占總?cè)丝诒壤鳛橘Y源豐裕度指標(biāo);控制經(jīng)濟區(qū)位之后對經(jīng)濟效率和自然資源稟賦進行計量分析,結(jié)果表明各省份自然資源對各種經(jīng)濟效率均有正向影響,而未構(gòu)成“資源詛咒”,但是各省份相鄰區(qū)域的自然資源稟賦對于具體省份經(jīng)濟效率并無影響;這一結(jié)果不同于以往“資源詛咒”研究的“存在-不存在”的二分法結(jié)論。
本文將上述結(jié)論歸結(jié)為當(dāng)前我國經(jīng)濟增長體制的政府主導(dǎo)、區(qū)域市場分割特征,核心機制是地方政府主導(dǎo)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟增長效率。具體來講,在當(dāng)前我國政府主導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟增長模式下,經(jīng)濟增長效率普遍不高,政府高度干預(yù)下制造業(yè)效率下降幅度要大于資源產(chǎn)業(yè),因此自然資源稟賦更好、資源產(chǎn)業(yè)份額更大的省份中整體經(jīng)濟效率也更高,即自然資源在我國當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟環(huán)境中構(gòu)成經(jīng)濟增長的“資源福祉”,而不是“資源詛咒”。
(編輯:王愛萍)
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[28]Jin H H, Qian Y Y, Barry R. Weingast.Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style[J].J Public Econ,2005,89(9):1719-1742.
[29]王永欽,張晏,章元,等.中國的大國發(fā)展道路:論分權(quán)式改革的得失[J].經(jīng)濟研究,2007,(1):4-16.[Wang Yongqin,Zhang Yan,Zhang Yuan,et al.On Chinas Development Model: The Costs and Benefits of Chinas Decentralization Approach to Transition[J].Economic Research Journal, 2007,(1):4-16.]
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[31]周黎安.中國地方官員的晉升錦標(biāo)賽模式研究[J].經(jīng)濟研究,2007,(7):36-50.[Zhou Lian. Governing Chinas Local Officials:An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Model[J].Economic Research Journal, 2007,(7):36-50.]
Abstract The major mechanisms of resources curse are that, excellent resources endowment lowers the inputoutput efficiency and economic development performance through decreasing the efficiency of market institute, impaires regular economic structures, and increases information cost in market. The necessary premise of the three mechanisms running is that market prices system, not government, domains the allocation structures of economic resources, but government leading has always been the obvious characteristics of economic growth in China. Thus, its necessary to consider governments role to analyze the nature of influence of natural resources to economic growth. Local governments impact on economic performance is always limited in their governing regions, therefore whether the nature resources curse inside their regions is consistent with it outside the regions, are the results of government leading economic growth. The efficiency improvement of economic growth of 31 provinces in China mainland from 2000 to 2010 is decomposed in terms of Malmquist index, and natural resources endowment is measured by the proportion of workers employed by resources industries in total population. Through controlling the economic locations, the econometric analysis results show that the endowments of natural resources increase the economic efficiencies obviously, but the endowment of neighboring provinces has no influence to each provinces economic efficiencies, and at the same time, economic location has obvious influence on each provinces technologic progress and economic efficiency, but no influence on the efficiency of applying technology. Its also found that that the institute efficiency of each province is not impacted by themselves and neighbor regions endowment of natural resources and economic locations. Institutes analysis implies that government dominance and market segmentation are the typical characteristics of our countries economic growth environments; therefore the performance of local governments is the one of the key influencing factors on economic growth. In this institute system, the resourcesblessing effect of natural resources is decided by governmental interference degree to economies, which is at large influenced by regional endowment of natural resources in present governmentdominance, marketsegmentation economic development environment.
Key words government dominance; market segmentation; resource curse; economic efficiency
[27]張卓元.轉(zhuǎn)變經(jīng)濟增長方式:政府改革是關(guān)鍵[J].財經(jīng)界,2006,(10):31-33.[Zhang Zhuoyuan.Changing the Pattern of Economic Growth,the Reform of Government is Key[J].Money China,2006,(10):31-33.]
[28]Jin H H, Qian Y Y, Barry R. Weingast.Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style[J].J Public Econ,2005,89(9):1719-1742.
[29]王永欽,張晏,章元,等.中國的大國發(fā)展道路:論分權(quán)式改革的得失[J].經(jīng)濟研究,2007,(1):4-16.[Wang Yongqin,Zhang Yan,Zhang Yuan,et al.On Chinas Development Model: The Costs and Benefits of Chinas Decentralization Approach to Transition[J].Economic Research Journal, 2007,(1):4-16.]
[30]Li H, Zhou L. Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J]. J Public Econ,2005,89(9-10):1743-1762.
[31]周黎安.中國地方官員的晉升錦標(biāo)賽模式研究[J].經(jīng)濟研究,2007,(7):36-50.[Zhou Lian. Governing Chinas Local Officials:An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Model[J].Economic Research Journal, 2007,(7):36-50.]
Abstract The major mechanisms of resources curse are that, excellent resources endowment lowers the inputoutput efficiency and economic development performance through decreasing the efficiency of market institute, impaires regular economic structures, and increases information cost in market. The necessary premise of the three mechanisms running is that market prices system, not government, domains the allocation structures of economic resources, but government leading has always been the obvious characteristics of economic growth in China. Thus, its necessary to consider governments role to analyze the nature of influence of natural resources to economic growth. Local governments impact on economic performance is always limited in their governing regions, therefore whether the nature resources curse inside their regions is consistent with it outside the regions, are the results of government leading economic growth. The efficiency improvement of economic growth of 31 provinces in China mainland from 2000 to 2010 is decomposed in terms of Malmquist index, and natural resources endowment is measured by the proportion of workers employed by resources industries in total population. Through controlling the economic locations, the econometric analysis results show that the endowments of natural resources increase the economic efficiencies obviously, but the endowment of neighboring provinces has no influence to each provinces economic efficiencies, and at the same time, economic location has obvious influence on each provinces technologic progress and economic efficiency, but no influence on the efficiency of applying technology. Its also found that that the institute efficiency of each province is not impacted by themselves and neighbor regions endowment of natural resources and economic locations. Institutes analysis implies that government dominance and market segmentation are the typical characteristics of our countries economic growth environments; therefore the performance of local governments is the one of the key influencing factors on economic growth. In this institute system, the resourcesblessing effect of natural resources is decided by governmental interference degree to economies, which is at large influenced by regional endowment of natural resources in present governmentdominance, marketsegmentation economic development environment.
Key words government dominance; market segmentation; resource curse; economic efficiency
[27]張卓元.轉(zhuǎn)變經(jīng)濟增長方式:政府改革是關(guān)鍵[J].財經(jīng)界,2006,(10):31-33.[Zhang Zhuoyuan.Changing the Pattern of Economic Growth,the Reform of Government is Key[J].Money China,2006,(10):31-33.]
[28]Jin H H, Qian Y Y, Barry R. Weingast.Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style[J].J Public Econ,2005,89(9):1719-1742.
[29]王永欽,張晏,章元,等.中國的大國發(fā)展道路:論分權(quán)式改革的得失[J].經(jīng)濟研究,2007,(1):4-16.[Wang Yongqin,Zhang Yan,Zhang Yuan,et al.On Chinas Development Model: The Costs and Benefits of Chinas Decentralization Approach to Transition[J].Economic Research Journal, 2007,(1):4-16.]
[30]Li H, Zhou L. Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J]. J Public Econ,2005,89(9-10):1743-1762.
[31]周黎安.中國地方官員的晉升錦標(biāo)賽模式研究[J].經(jīng)濟研究,2007,(7):36-50.[Zhou Lian. Governing Chinas Local Officials:An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Model[J].Economic Research Journal, 2007,(7):36-50.]
Abstract The major mechanisms of resources curse are that, excellent resources endowment lowers the inputoutput efficiency and economic development performance through decreasing the efficiency of market institute, impaires regular economic structures, and increases information cost in market. The necessary premise of the three mechanisms running is that market prices system, not government, domains the allocation structures of economic resources, but government leading has always been the obvious characteristics of economic growth in China. Thus, its necessary to consider governments role to analyze the nature of influence of natural resources to economic growth. Local governments impact on economic performance is always limited in their governing regions, therefore whether the nature resources curse inside their regions is consistent with it outside the regions, are the results of government leading economic growth. The efficiency improvement of economic growth of 31 provinces in China mainland from 2000 to 2010 is decomposed in terms of Malmquist index, and natural resources endowment is measured by the proportion of workers employed by resources industries in total population. Through controlling the economic locations, the econometric analysis results show that the endowments of natural resources increase the economic efficiencies obviously, but the endowment of neighboring provinces has no influence to each provinces economic efficiencies, and at the same time, economic location has obvious influence on each provinces technologic progress and economic efficiency, but no influence on the efficiency of applying technology. Its also found that that the institute efficiency of each province is not impacted by themselves and neighbor regions endowment of natural resources and economic locations. Institutes analysis implies that government dominance and market segmentation are the typical characteristics of our countries economic growth environments; therefore the performance of local governments is the one of the key influencing factors on economic growth. In this institute system, the resourcesblessing effect of natural resources is decided by governmental interference degree to economies, which is at large influenced by regional endowment of natural resources in present governmentdominance, marketsegmentation economic development environment.
Key words government dominance; market segmentation; resource curse; economic efficiency