Trends of International Maritime Politics and China’s Strategic Choices

Hu Bo

Trends of International Maritime Politics and China’s Strategic Choices

Hu Bo

In parallel with the great scientific and technological improvements, the depth and breadth of mankind’s understanding, exploration and management of the seas has been expedited. The value and role of the seas for mankind and international politics is ever more conspicuous. However, so far, the study of international maritime politics by academics at home and abroad, which mainly focuses on sea power, maritime rights and interests, and maritime governance, is unsystematic and lacks coherence. In order to better grasp the regularities of international maritime politics and guide the practice of international relations, it is necessary to consider the international maritime politics as a whole, define its contents and observe its development. As an emerging maritime power, China needs to accurately grasp the trend of international maritime politics and make prudent choices in the process of building itself into a maritime power.

Three Major Themes of International Maritime Politics

International maritime politics, as the term suggests, refers to the international interactions taking place in the maritime space or related to the seas. It is the competition and cooperation among sovereign states on issues such as maritime control, maritime development and maritime governance, which involve maritime power, maritime interests and maritime responsibilities. The practice of international maritime politics, which has gone through simpleto complex, has existed since ancient times. The successive occurrence of the three major themes of sea control, maritime development and maritime governance is closely related to the overall development of mankind.

Sea control and sea power

The primary significance of the seas for international politics lies in transportation, and the most basic function of international maritime politics is to influence or intervene the distribution of land power through the control of the seas.1“Sea control” and “command of the seas” are similar and frequently confused concepts. Command of the seas is an ideal expression of sea control, which means absolute control over the seas. In fact, sea control or command of the seas over a certain area by a country’s navy contains two meanings: one side enjoys a complete or high degree of freedom of movement in the area, but for its enemy it is the opposite. Unlike land power, the value of commanding the seas lies not in its physical conquest or possession. As the concept of “command of the seas” is too absolute, “sea control” has been more frequently used in recent English literature. The navy manuals of the US and the UK have also begun to replace “command of the sea” with“sea control.”Historically, the maritime power structure in the Mediterranean directly affected the rise and fall of ancient Greece and ancient Rome. In modern times, with the advent of the Age of Sail and the grand expansion of European colonialism and imperialism, the sea and oceans, as passages, have increasingly become important. Control of key maritime passages means control of global trade and even indirectly the ability to shape the international structure. Thus, developing a strong navy and striving for sea control has gradually become important prerequisites and main ways for imperialist countries to compete for colonies or spheres of influence.

With regard to sea power and command of the seas, the most systematic theoretical review dates back to the American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. In 1890, Mahan systematically put forward the theory of sea power and command of the seas, stressing that “winning the command of the seas implies domination of the world.” He summed up six major conditions (geographical position, natural endowment, extent of territory, population size, national traits, and government characters) and three key elements (production, maritime transport, and colonies) that affect the sea power of a country. By reinterpreting the history of hegemonic struggles in Europein the 17th and 18th centuries, he tried to prove the significance of the command of the seas to the fate of a nation, believing that “the prosperity of Britain stems from its unrestricted control of the seas, and the decline of France has to put the blame on its ignorance of sea power.”2Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, translated by An Changrong and Cheng Zhongqin, Chinese People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 2006, p.96.Mahan’s main contribution was that he explored for the first time the value and effectiveness of sea power as a means to realize a nation’s grand strategy, and synthesized the various disconnected ideas of sea power into a set of strictly logical philosophy. On this basis, he systematically elaborated a number of fundamental strategic principles of sea power.3Wu Zhengyu, “Influence and Extent of Mahan’s Sea Power Theory,” International Politics Quarterly, No.2, 2008, p.107.Almost at the same time as Mahan, in the same historical context, British thinkers like Sir Julian Stafford Corbet summed up another set of sea power theory, called the “British School.” They stressed that there was an inseparable link between maritime and land-based operations, and maritime operation was part of a greater undertaking; the command of the seas was relative rather than absolute, which was generally in a state of contention between rivals.4Michael I. Handel, “Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu,” Naval War College Review, Vol.53, 2000, p.87.

The establishment of the above two different theories indicates that as an independent variable affecting international politics, sea power began to attract the attention of politicians and strategists and became established as a concept or theoretical system. It is generally believed that the notion of sea power articulated by Mahan has two meanings: narrowly, sea power means control of the seas achieved through various advantages; broadly, sea power includes the maritime military forces dominating the seas by force, as well as other maritime elements closely related to the maintenance of a nation’s economic prosperity.5Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, London: Macmillan, 1982, p.33.Scholars after Mahan generally tended to define sea power from the broad perspective. Mahan’s discourse on sea power in his writings not only affected the rise of the United States at seas, but also stimulated the maritime adventures of the German and Japanese Empires.However, it must be admitted that the inference on the command of the seas by Mahan and his disciples was too absolute and inconsistent with historical facts. In the history of sea power, there has never been absolute command of the seas. Even in the heyday of the British Empire, the command of the seas of the British Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, the Americas, Asia and other regions were constantly facing large or small challenges from its opponents.

Since the end of World War II, the independence of developing countries, the emerging role of international institutions and norms, and the increasingly complex international political environment, have made control of the seas by maritime powers face more and more political and legal restrictions. America’s maritime supremacy must also be established on the basis of sharing power with its allies and other major powers. Furthermore, with the development of military technology or equipment such as missiles, spaceflight and land-based long-range fighters, maritime strength has appeared to be more fragile and absolute command of the seas has grown further from reach. In this regard, maritime strategic analysts are increasingly aware that it is difficult to possess absolute command of the seas, and maritime powers have gradually accepted in practice the concept of relative command of the seas. After the end of the Cold War, as global maritime security became more prominent, and missions and roles of the navy became more diversified, the issue of maritime security has quickly fallen under the purview of sea power theorists. Geoffrey Till held that the navies of China and the United States were a mixture of “modern navy” and “post-modern navy.” The former’s mission is more traditional, the contention of the command of the seas is characterized with exclusiveness and competitiveness, while the latter’s priority is not to compete with opponents for command of the seas, but to maintain overall maritime security by ensuring a good maritime order.6Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century, Taylor&Francis Group, 2009, pp.6-19.Today, command of the seas is still one of the core issues of international maritime politics, the battle for command of the seas never stops for a moment, but the major maritime powers have basically accepted the concept of relative control and limited cooperation. The contradictionbetween the free use of the seas pursued by major maritime powers and the denial ability pursued by second-tier maritime powers has basically determined the extent of maritime control in global seas.

Maritime development and maritime interests

Far before the emergence of the state, human beings started to develop and utilize the seas, but not until the end of World War II did maritime development become a major topic of international politics. “Science and technology has expanded the capability of mankind to utilize the seas and maritime resources, but has caused the deficiency of sea areas and maritime resources, and has also stimulated some countries to energetically expand the area under their jurisdiction so as to eliminate the possibility of depredations of other countries.”7Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence, translated by Lin Maohui, et al., Chinese People’s Public Security University Press, 1991, p.107.As a source of resources, the sea and ocean’s status and role is constantly evolving, and issues such as marine fisheries, oil and gas, deep sea mineral exploration have gradually got into the agenda of international politics. In 1945, President Truman of the United States declared in the Proclamation 2667, that the US government “regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.”8“Proclamation 2667 - Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf,” September 28, 1945, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. php?pid=12332.Subsequently, similar statements were made by some other countries. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, adopted at the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1958, defined the term “continental shelf”as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.”9Convention on the Continental Shelf, Article 1, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ conventions/8_1_1958_continental_shelf.pdf.Since then, with continuousefforts of scientists from various countries, mankind has greatly improved the understanding of deep sea resources. Large numbers of polymetallic manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, submarine hydrothermal sulfides, submarine gas hydrates, and deep sea biological gene resources have been found, whose reserves are far more than the resources proven on land.10Fang Yinxia, Bao Gengsheng, and Jin Xianglong, “Prospects for the Exploitation and Utilization of Deep-Sea Resources in the 21st Century,” Marine Science Bulletin, No.5, 2000, pp.73-74.

The contradiction between the free use of the seas pursued by major maritime powers and the denial ability pursued by second-tier maritime powers has basically determined the extent of maritime control in global seas.

At the same time, with largescale wars between major powers decreasing in frequency and likelihood, and independence and emergence of developing countries one after another, their demands for development have become more urgent and important. The process of three negotiations on the law of the sea after World War II has fully reflected the demands for peace and development of the majority of countries in the world, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”), which is known as the Charter of the Sea, highlights the ardent expectations placed upon the oceans for development. In fact, while most countries have experienced long-term post-war peaceful development, they are all facing the problem of resource shortage. In the absence of alternatives, the development and possession of maritime resources to the fullest extent has naturally become the reasonable choice of these countries.

The core issue of negotiations at the three conferences on the law of the sea was the allocation of global maritime space and jurisdiction over the resources. Centered on concepts of exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, international seabed area and high seas, not only all the coastal nations, but also most of landlocked countries took part in the negotiating process and formulation of rules. It is no exaggeration to say that the negotiations on the Convention were a major maritime political event with the mostextensive participation in the history of international relations. Since then, special interests together with power politics have become two major themes of international maritime politics. Given the influence of maritime development and competing maritime interests on international politics, from the 1970s, a group of political scientists have begun to break away from the monotonous political framework of sea power or command of the seas, to explore the relationship between oceans and international politics from a more comprehensive perspective.11For international literature in this respect, see George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence; J. R. V. Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries of the World; Barry Buzan, Seabed Politics. For Chinese literature that proposed analysis of international maritime politics in the composite framework of power and rights politics, see Liu Zhongmin, “Review of International Maritime Political Studies in Chinese IR Research,” Pacific Journal, No.6, 2009, pp.78-89; Gong Jianhua,“Analytical Framework of Maritime Politics and Evolution of Chinese Maritime Politics Strategy,” The New Orient, No.6, 2011, pp.6-10.

Maritime governance and maritime responsibility

The connectivity and indivisibility of global seas determines that the utilization and management of the seas has the congenital feature of openness. When developing the sea and oceans, the coastal states need to take into account their international responsibilities. Economic globalization has deepened the dependence of mankind on the sea and oceans, and various security threats have gone beyond borders and become global problems due to the high degree of maritime connectivity. Tasks such as coping with piracy and transnational crime, protecting the maritime environment, and maintaining maritime safety have increasingly been beyond the capacity of a single or several countries. In view of this, the ocean, as one of the three“global commons,”12Outer space and cyberspace are two other global commons. For representative literature, see Abraham M. Denmark, “Managing the Global Commons,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol.33, No.3, 2010, pp.165-182; John Vogler, The Global Commons: Environmental and Technological Governance, John Wiley High Education, 2000; Michael Goldman, Privatizing Nature: Political Struggles for the Global Commons, London: Pluto Press, 1998; Magnus Wijkman, “Managing the Global Commons,” International Organization, Vol.36, No.3, 1982, pp.511-356; Susan J. Buck, The Global Commons: An Introduction, Washington, D. C.: Island Press, 1998.is more and more attracting the attention of the international community.

The governance of maritime commons has placed the demands of shouldering necessary responsibilities and obligations on maritime countries, especially major powers. While pursuing their own power, influence and reputation, the major powers must hold high the banner of safeguarding maritime commons. Around 2010, the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review of the United States and reports from think tanks of the US and NATO have unanimously stressed the importance of safeguarding global commons.13The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States 2010, May 2010, p. 49, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010, February 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/ QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf; C. Raja Mohan, “U.S.-India Initiative Series: India, the United States and the Global Commons,” Center for a New American Security, October 2010, http://www.cnas.org/files/ documents/publications/CNAS_IndiatheUnitedStatesandtheGlobalCommons_Mohan.pdf; Michael Auslin,“Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons: Toward a Regional Strategy,” American Enterprise Institute, December 2010, http://www.aei.org/docLib/AuslinReportWedDec152010.pdf; Brooke Smith-Windsor,“Securing the Commons: Towards NATO’s New Maritime Strategy,” NATO Defense College, Rome, September 2009, http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode1.There are no sharp contradictions among major countries in the governance of maritime commons. The major coastal states, including the United States, are fully aware that no single country can manage the entire ocean all by itself. The problem lies in the “Tragedy of the Commons,” as what happened in the negotiations on climate change, where each country tries its best to shirk their responsibilities, while worrying that other countries will benefit more therefrom. The crux of the governance of maritime commons is the issue of responsibility distribution.

The governance of maritime commons has placed the demands of shouldering necessary responsibilities and obligations on maritime countries, especially major powers.

Existing writings on international maritime politics often discuss competition for command of the seas or benefits of ocean development, but maritime governance has not yet attracted enough attention from academics, and the governance of maritime commons has rarely been highlighted to be one of the three major subjects of international maritime politics. Maritimeaffairs are quite different from the land ones; even in the era of colonial empires, the oceans were a realm not only composed of power and interests, but also of responsibility, which means that coastal states have inherent obligations to contribute to the protection of waterway safety, cross-sea communication, ocean observation, disaster relief and other fields. Although often being accompanied by concerns of power and interests, these obligations inevitably have the attributes of international public goods. With maritime activities gradually going beyond territorial waters and exclusive economic zones to the high seas and the international seabed area, global governance of the seas has carried more weight in international maritime politics.

It should be noted that the above three major subjects have a certain degree of overlapping. While reasonable demands for maritime power can be regarded as part of national interests, excessive desires for maritime power accord less with overall national maritime interests. In fact, part of maritime responsibility coincides with maritime power and interests; in the process of pursuing maritime power and interests, a state will indirectly perform certain maritime responsibilities. On the contrary, while performing maritime responsibilities, a state can at the same time achieve maritime power and interests. However, maritime power and interests after all cannot fully translate into the public feature of maritime responsibility.

Trends of International Maritime Politics

Throughout the human’s maritime history, three major factors have influenced the development of international maritime politics. The first is scientific and technological advance. Previous major changes and evolution of maritime politics are inseparable from the promotion of science and technology. The second is the global political environment. Under different political cultures, the patterns of maritime competition are widely divergent. The third is the structure of the balance of power. Strength is the basis of a nation’s successful management of sea and oceans, and maritime politics depends on the overall international politics. Among the three factors, the first two are fundamentalones. Based on the factors and historical experience, we can cautiously predict the development trends of international maritime politics.

First, the three major subjects of international maritime politics will develop increasingly in a balanced way.The post-Cold War international structure has placed the United States in an absolutely dominant position on the sea. However, good times didn’t last long. With rapid military modernization of countries such as China and Russia, the US is facing a huge “anti-access / area-denial” dilemma in the coastal waters of other major powers. Although the navies of China and Russia are relatively weak, they can greatly intensify the vulnerability of the US Navy in offshore operations by wielding anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, high-performance fighters, advanced torpedoes, silent submarines and other advanced weapons with the support of land platform, thus stripping the US, to a certain extent, of the ability to intervene in Eurasian coastal affairs. In the early 21st century, competitions among global maritime powers were once again demonstrated in another form, where past battles between fleets on the high seas were replaced by tussles in offshore areas. China and other traditional land powers accelerated their pace “from the land to the sea,”while the United States and other major maritime powers greatly adjusted their maritime strategies, and compressed the space of land-based countries“from the sea to the land.” The strategic collision between the two trends is particularly highlighted in the offshore areas adjacent to the land powers. China and other coastal countries try to defend their own sovereignty and sovereign rights, and pursue their maritime status commensurate with their strengths, while the United States continues to seek for global maritime supremacy. The contradiction has become the theme of competition between global maritime powers.

Due to the rapid development of maritime science and technology, mankind is entering a stage of comprehensive utilization of the oceans, especially in exploration of the deep sea, which will soon witness substantial breakthroughs. The exploitation of oil and gas resources in offshore areas and shallow continental shelf has become saturated; most of the newlyproven reserves are from the deep sea. As of the end of October 2016, the International Seabed Authority had approved a total of 26 applications for exploration for polymetallic manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts and polymetallic sulfides, and most of the applications and approvals were made in the last two years.14International Seabed Authority, “Deep Seabed Minerals Contractors,” https://www.isa.org.jm/deepseabed-minerals-contractors.The United States, Britain and some other countries are developing new types of mining equipment. It is expected that commercial mining will be achieved within 5 to 10 years. Large-scale deepsea exploration and development has gradually been put on the maritime powers’ scientific and technological development agenda. As exploitation and survey of deep sea mining resources continues, records of deep sea oil and gas reserves have been set one after another and the deep sea biological gene resources are increasingly attracting maritime powers’ attention. At present, mankind has explored only 5% of the seabed, with 95% still unknown,15ational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, “95% Unexplored,”http://www.noaa.gov/oceans-coasts.and thus the prospect of maritime development is quite promising. Over the past ten years, the major maritime powers have striven to develop deep sea observation networks and manned/unmanned submerged deep-dive equipment. The capability of perceiving and developing the deep sea has been greatly enhanced, which provides technical support for commercial utilization of deep sea resources.

With the focus of maritime activities shifting from offshore areas to the deep sea and from waters under jurisdiction to the high seas, many global challenges such as maritime environmental degradation and natural or manmade disasters will further ferment and attract more attention, and the humanistic emotions and solicitude of mankind for the ocean will also become more stereoscopic and abundant. In this context, while conducting military, economic and other activities in the seas, every country has to pay more attention to the public good and responsibility in the oceans. The core task of international maritime politics and system will also be shifted frommaking rules concerning the seas under jurisdiction to standardizing human activities in public sea zones. In this way, the needs of national security and development will become increasingly balanced, and so will the development in military, economic, diplomatic and other areas. A country is not likely to survive without strong defense, but it is more and more difficult to work only by force. The power politics and competition concerning sea control will not be averted, but maritime development and governance issues will attract further worldwide attention. The trend of concurrent evolvement of the three major themes of maritime politics will be more prominent. While the structure of military power is by no means antithetic to the oceans system, there exists a considerable degree of disaccord between the authority of formulating rules and the general level of military power.16Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence, p.166.In the future, the structure of international maritime politics will be partly disjointed with the balance of military force. Diplomatic tussles and legal struggles are becoming the main form of gaining power, interests and discourse, and the main content of international maritime politics.

In the future, the structure of international maritime politics will be partly disjointed with the balance of military force. Diplomatic tussles and legal struggles are becoming the main form of gaining power, interests and discourse, and the main content of international maritime politics.

As conditions have undergone fundamental changes, it is difficult for any country to continue or follow the dualistic road of pursuing maritime power based on the concepts of “expanding sphere of influence through trade” and “command of the seas” in Mahan’s writings. This is not only the issue facing China, a late-mover maritime country, but also an important subject that traditional maritime powers like the United States and Britain have to face. As the content of maritime competition becomes more plentiful and varied, the development of military forces is only one majorapproach, while diplomatic leverages and maritime economic capability play an increasingly prominent role. The ranking of the world’s maritime powers is bound to be based on the development level of maritime economy, diplomatic skills and the ability to proficiently utilize the international law. “In today’s world, the struggles around national maritime rights and interests have shown some new features: the main aims of the contention for and control of the seas have changed from mainly military advantages in the past into economic interests, from mainly for sea areas and passages of strategic importance into for sovereignty of islands and reefs, jurisdiction over sea areas and maritime resources. The contention for the seas between superpowers and maritime powers has also changed into extensive participation of coastal states, especially developing countries in their struggle for national maritime rights and interests.”17Zhao Chengguo, “Basic Elements of China’s Approach to a Maritime Power,” in Qu Jinliang, Studies of Chinese Maritime Culture (Volume III), Ocean Press, 2002, p.9.In order to adapt to the competitive situation of increasingly complex international maritime politics, coastal countries have taken the similar actions to strengthen institutional adjustment of sea-related departments and establish integrated maritime management agencies.18In December 2004, then US President George W. Bush signed the Executive Order 13366 that established the Committee on Ocean Policy as a part of the Council on Environmental Quality, to coordinate maritime activities of different governmental bodies and take comprehensive responsibility of the US maritime policy. In 2010, then President Obama signed the Executive Order 13547 “Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes” that revoked the Committee on Ocean Policy and established the cabinet-level National Ocean Council, which is directly affiliated to the President’s executive office and responsible for coordinating the maritime affairs of federal agencies, in order to effectively implement the national maritime policy. In July 2007, according to its Basic Act on Ocean Policy, Japan established the Headquarters for Comprehensive Ocean Policy, which is the highest leading agency of Japan’s maritime affairs. The Prime Minister acts as its Director-General and the Minister of State for Ocean Policy, served by the Minister of Land Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, takes the main responsibility. Members of the Headquarters also include other ministers and the Cabinet Secretariat assumes the administrative role. Russia has also attached great importance to comprehensive management of maritime affairs, and set up a mechanism nearly ten years earlier than the United States. In September 2001, the Russian federal government approved the establishment of the Ocean Committee as a standing leading organ responsible for coordinating all maritime activities by federal executive agencies, the authorities of federal subjects and research institutes. So far, the adjustment and reform of coastal states’ comprehensive management mechanisms is just in the initial stage and has a long way to go.

Second, the main role of maritime military forces lies in deterrence rather than actual combat.It is undeniable that military competitionand even intense maritime arms race will exist over a long period of time. According to the statistics of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global military spending in 2015 totaled as high as $1.6 trillion, most of which went to naval and air force equipment, especially naval equipment.19The International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016, February 2016, p.19.

Since the end of World War II, with the emergence of nuclear weapons, the development of economic globalization and interdependence, and the growth of world anti-war and pro-peace forces, peace and development have become the main themes of the times. The system of nation states has been steadily consolidated and the principle of sovereignty, though facing challenges, gains more momentum and the world almost has no power vacuum zone. The signing and implementation of the Convention marked the first adjustment of the world’s maritime order through negotiations and consultations rather than wars.

The effective nuclear deterrence among major powers has greatly inhibited the occurrence of the hot war. Under this circumstance, other new forms of rivalry such as “hybrid warfare,” “cool war” and “gray zone” have gradually become the new focus of defense departments. The advent of the“hybrid warfare” concept fully reflects the reality of the diversification of the world’s security threats and missions of the army.20Ge Xiangyu and Xu Xiangdong, “More Practical Theories on Hybrid War of the U.S. Army,” National Defense Science & Technology, No.1, 2011, p.60.The “cool war” concept, which emerged under the great background featuring the combination of geopolitical competition and economic interdependence, reflects the state of a comprehensive game, in which major powers compete and cooperate at the same time and avoid all-out confrontation with each other.21David Rothkopf, “The Cool War,” Foreign policy, February 20, 2013, http://foreignpolicy. com/2013/02/20/the-cool-war.The new“cool war” era is the competition for dominance, allies and resources between the United States and the newly emerging developing countries. The conflict is already visible in Asia and will be extended to the Middle East, Africaand the rest of the world.22Noah Feldman, Cool War: The Future of Global Competition, translated by Hong Man, Xinhua Press, 2014.“Gray zone” refers to competitive interactions between states, within states or between states and non-state actors that is in no way peace but short of a formal state of war. This kind of confrontation usually originates from the friction between law enforcement forces or among other non-military forces, brings gradual changes to the status quo, and is of a vague nature that goes between law enforcement and war and between legal and illegal.23Randy Pugh, “Contest the Gray Zone,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol.42, No.11, 2016, pp.56-60.It is called “gray” because it has the following three characteristics: ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, and uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.24The Gray Zone, United States Special Operations Command White Paper, September 2015.

The cost and constraints of maritime military operations will continue to increase. Furthermore, it is increasingly difficult to achieve desired goals through war. First of all, the platforms on the land and at the sea have become more integrated, and maritime forces are more susceptible to threats and challenges from the land. Historically, the fundamental reason why colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism could gain global predominance by relying on the navy was that the strength of most of the third-world countries was too weak, rather than that the maritime power had a natural edge over land power. With the rise of the third-world countries, especially the countries as strong as China and India, which have mastered advanced military technologies, maritime hegemonism and power politics are in an increasingly difficult position. It is more difficult to change the status quo by military means, and the advance of international mechanisms and economic globalization is shifting the focus of employing maritime power from military tasks to diplomatic and constabulary roles, and from open sea to coastal waters.25Muhammad Zarrar Haider, “Impact of Naval Technology on Employment of Maritime Power,” Defense Journal, Vol.17, No.9, 2014, pp.45-46.

The naval forces of the major powers are still preparing for large-scalewarfare. However, it is no longer the main task of current and future navies to gain the command of the seas by a war. The functions of maritime forces mainly include deterrence, sea control, power projection and maritime security. The United States added the function of “all domain access” in the 2015 edition ofA Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Whether in the hybrid war or the cool war, or for the navy’s own functional development, deterrence is the primary role of major powers’ navies in global maritime politics, and also the function exercised most frequently. In “gray zone”confrontation, military force is often not in the front line of conflict; its role is to provide support and safeguard for law enforcement or other forces.

Third, the international maritime political structure will gradually gravitate for multi-polarization.From the capacity of maritime economic development and the proportion in global maritime economy, the United States is undoubtedly a maritime power, but it is only one of many. In view of the capability to shape the maritime order, the US, while still powerful, is not decisive with veto power. The role of other major powers and even small and medium-sized state blocs has rapidly risen, and the signing and implementation of the Convention is a very good example. In a sense, today’s marine world has already been a structure of multi-polarity.

Of course, the United States still maintains the global maritime military supremacy. But even in the military field, the trend of decentralization and diversification of sea power is also increasingly strengthened. Decentralization means that the command of the global seas by the United States is being squeezed by more and more countries, and different levels of command of global, regional and offshore seas have come into being and established a mutually restrictive relationship, featuring a characteristic of relativity.26Sun Jianzhong, “Sea Power in the 21st Century: Historical Experience and Chinese Focus,” in Zhu Feng, Redefining Sea Power in the 21st Century, World Affairs Press, 2016, p.16.Diversity means that due to diversified technical programs, countries with different geographical conditions, endowments and capabilities have multiple ways to carry out sea control with quite different approaches. Therefore, it is unnecessary and impossible for China, Russiaand other countries to follow the United States in developing sea power.

The unbalanced development of land and sea technologies has accelerated the decentralization of maritime power, and the edges of traditional sea power have been more and more restricted. However, due to global proliferation of precision guided weapons and sensors, the sea, particularly the littoral areas, may become the most competitive and thus the most dangerous battle space.27Phillip E. Pournelle, “The Deadly Future of Littoral Sea Control,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2015, Vol.141/7/1,349, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-07/deadly-future-littoral-seacontrol.Since the end of World War II, the development of missiles, long-range air power, and information and aerospace technologies has made strong mobility and long-range delivery no longer a patent of maritime forces; the extensive use of “anti-access”technology has increased the vulnerability of maritime forces, especially in the littoral waters near the mainland. In particular areas, the mainland powers have established certain natural strategic advantages over the sea powers, which is named “l(fā)and-based sea power” by some experts.28James R. Holmes, “An Age of Land-Based Sea Power?” The Diplomat, March 25, 2013, http:// thediplomat.com/2013/03/An-age-of-land-based-sea-power.This theory goes that land-based fighters, unmanned aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, among other weapons, can make coastal countries subdue the enemy even without a strong maritime fleet. Under certain technical conditions, the world’s No.2, No.3 or even medium-sized countries may have partial edges over the world’s No.1 in a particular sea area. It will be more and more difficult to establish or maintain traditional maritime hegemony. In the foreseeable future, though late-coming maritime powers such as China and India are unable to challenge the United States worldwide, they have the potential to change the power structure in the Western Pacific Northern Indian Ocean

The unbalanced development of land and sea technologies has accelerated the decentralization of maritime power, and the edges of traditional sea power have been more and more restricted.respectively. In the long run, the predominant position of the United States on the sea will inevitably decline, and the world’s maritime power structure will be more polarized. In addition, in the era of interdependence, the international maritime political landscape will also become increasingly multi-polarized due to lack of power reshuffling that usually comes with large-scale wars.

The influence of maritime powers has also been eroded by mediumsized countries and even non-state actors. At present, the difficulty and complexity of developing and using high-tech military weapons and equipment is higher than in previous eras and the research and development period can often last ten or even twenty years. Under these circumstances, it is much harder to convert economic strength into military might.29Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twentyfirst Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Winter 2015/16), p.40.As a result of the deepening of global division of labor, the advanced battle platforms, such as aircraft carriers, fighters and bombers, are actually the products of direct or indirect cooperation with other countries. It will be very difficult for the military powers, including the United States, to create any advanced sophisticated weapons and equipment without the technology and accessories from other countries. Similarly due to division of labor, coupled with ever-changing communications technologies and accelerated proliferation of information, medium-sized countries, especially those economically developed ones, are often able to master some highend manufacturing and advanced technologies. If these countries do not pursue symmetric power or all-out confrontation with the major powers, these countries can also have certain advantages in specific areas or create substantial challenges to the navies of those major powers in particular regions. If we further lower the criteria of power, power will diffuse not only from big countries to ordinary countries. “Enabled by communications technologies, power almost certainly will shift more toward multifaceted and amorphous networks composed of state and non-state actors that willform to influence global policies on various issues. Leadership of such networks will be a function of position, enmeshment, diplomatic skill, and constructive demeanor.”30US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, December 2012, p.xii, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf.

In addition, as maritime threats become increasingly complex and diverse, cooperation is the general trend. The powerful naval weapons of major powers and the control of the seas have been unable to cope with the complex non-traditional security threats and asymmetric challenges of the 21st century. The US Navy is militarily invincible, but it cannot effectively destroy terrorists.31Capt. R. B. Watts, “The End of Sea Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2009, Vol.135/9/1,279, pp.23-26.Many technologies that can undermine or even paralyze the international system are becoming cheaper, and the use of biochemical weapons, computer viruses and so on is widely popular.32Paul Kennedy, “History, Politics and Maritime Power,” RUSI Journal, No.3, 2004, pp.15-16.The state can no longer monopolize violence, especially in the open maritime space. Since the end of the Cold War, in the face of maritime threats and diversification of the navy’s missions, the United States has actively advocated maritime security cooperation, successively putting forward the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Thousand Ship Navy Plan, and the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative, among others, and highlighting in a high profile the need for international cooperation in its 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security and 2007A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. In the 2015 version ofA Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the United States stressed the challenges and risks of China’s anti-access/ area denial capabilities, and on the other hand, frankly admitted that the Chinese navy had made more and more contributions to fighting piracy, providing humanitarian assistance, and involved in largescale multilateral exercises and other maritime affairs.33The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, Forward-Engaged-Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, March 2016.Compared with the United States, China lacks the ability and resources to defend sea lines of communication and overseas interests by military means worldwide, whichmakes cooperation its major choice.

Thinking on China’s Strategy of Maritime Development

The inertia of history is huge, with power politics and the Cold War mentality still accompanying like a phantom. However, the tide cannot be reversed. The new trends of international maritime politics are implicitly changing the world. The current reality is exactly the composite force of history and future, and of experience and trend. In the process of moving into the blue waters, China needs to achieve a better balance among multiple missions, such as being aware of its own national conditions, getting familiar with the historical experience of others, and gaining insights into the general trends that are emerging.

Adapting to the competitive development of the three maritime political agendas.With the increasing balance and diversification of maritime political agendas, the connotation of a maritime power is also changing. As a large maritime country, China must take into account the three major agendas of maritime control, maritime development and maritime governance comprehensively; relying solely on any one of them is neither realistic nor feasible. In order to become a major maritime power, China must conduct paradigm innovation, and it will be hard to copy the historical paradigms of realizing maritime power status through military, economic or any other single means. In contrast with the rise of the past maritime powers, the Chinese style of a maritime power must be a comprehensive one, whose aim should include three aspects: powerful maritime forces, robust maritime economy and sound maritime political power, and its means should also be all-round, involving military, politics, economy, diplomacy, culture and so on. In fact, China has unwittingly been adapting to the changed maritime politics. The Chinese navy has not traveled all around the world, but China’s maritime economic activities have long been present in every corner of the global sea and oceans. Chinese maritime forces also play an increasingly important role in copingwith piracy, transnational crime, terrorism, maritime security and other global issues. In the future, China should more consciously promote the accordance between building a maritime power and the three major agendas of international maritime politics.

Balancing what to change and what not to change.On one hand, China needs reform and innovation, but there is no mature and realistic approaches from which to draw lessons. The pursuit of any maritime power is the choice made in a certain era, under specific conditions and based on their own natural endowments. In history, there have never been two identical sea powers; even the United States and Britain are quite different in their paths to become maritime powers and the composition of their powers. Compared with Britain and the US, today’s China is facing a completely different situation: the use of large-scale force has been greatly restricted, and global peace will maintain for a long time; the imbalanced, complex and diffusive characters of military technological development, to a large extent, have changed the building paths, operational methods and implementation effectiveness of military forces. As a typical land-sea compound country, China has relatively unfavorable maritime geography and lack maritime resource space. These factors determine that China cannot directly duplicate the experience of Britain, the United States and other maritime powers. China must make necessary innovation according to its own conditions, the changed times and technical conditions, and in light of new strengths and new trends of a maritime power.

On the other hand, in the long course of the history of human maritime civilization, there is no lack of some relatively constant laws and experience for China to learn, thus China cannot stress too much on its distinction. Among them, China should pay special attention to two regular rules. The first is the pursuit of the status of power. Any maritime power cannot ignore the means to gaining and maintaining power, because only the rights and interests conferred by the international laws are far from enough, not to mention the fact that the international law is also dynamically developing. Power and status comes naturally with a strong nation, whichChina neither flinches from talking about nor has to sidestep. China does not pursue maritime hegemony, but it requires certain strategic space, international political status and effective maritime forces. The second is the transformation of civilization. Maritime power must be supported by maritime civilization, and the transformation of civilization is the social and cultural guarantee for China’s path to a maritime power. The maritime civilization inherited by Britain and the United States has unparalleled broadness and depth in its maritime practice, which had not only dross of dirty colonial expansion and hegemony war, but also much accumulated essence of human civilization. It is never late for China to learn from the mentality and capability of the western civilization of understanding, using and controlling the oceans, and to learn from the western countries’ excellent experience of the usage of maritime laws, diplomatic skills and maritime forces and so on.

Following the peaceful path to a maritime power.Historically, the rise of the maritime powers was always accompanied by large-scale wars, and Britain, the United States, Japan and so on all established their own status of maritime power through warfare at sea. Now, since overall peace can be expected and rise by force lacks feasibility, China should make the effective use and development of the oceans as its goal, and expand its maritime interests by comprehensive use of military, diplomatic and economic strengths. Under the deterrence of strong military power, clever diplomatic strategy, excellent ability of shaping international rules and maritime economic management will be the principal means for building maritime power. Large-scale warfare will no longer be the main way to obtain power, position and maritime interests. Normally, China should achieve its goals in a peaceful way through non-military operations.

In practice, China should take full advantage of military, diplomatic, international law and economic approaches. Considering the increasingly lower possibility of large-scale wars between major powers, the use of military deterrence will become more common, and the development of diplomacy, international law and maritime economy will be equally important apartfrom military force. Chinese diplomacy should promote the transformation from one of a farming civilization to one featuring a maritime civilization, strive for discourse of the world’s maritime politics, and vigorously develop the marine economy. China should follow the principle of “seeking for taking advantages rather than absolute control,” strengthen international cooperation, actively expand its maritime space, obtain maritime resources and gain maritime status through diplomatic, international law, economic and other means, so as to become a comprehensive world maritime power in line with international law.

Fully understanding the dynamic and limited features of sea power.The concept of sea power is not immutable. Because military technology, the conditions of the times and the international political environment has undergone great changes, the sea power concept has greatly evolved from that in the Mahan times. Though the modernization of China’s military power has not yet been completed, and its capability is far from the requirement of performing necessary maritime control and other traditional missions, China needs to attach great importance to the missions of “post-modern navy” and keep better balance and consideration between the acquirement of sea power and the fulfillment of international maritime responsibilities.

In respect of the development and use of sea power, the United States is undoubtedly the best available example for China to learn from, but China cannot and need not attempt follow the United States’ suit of seeking global maritime dominance. Considering its compound landsea geographical characteristics, and relatively unfavorable maritime geographical conditions, China is unlikely to develop a maritime force that has global layout, global offensive and defensive capabilities. Even if China’s economic size, comprehensive national strength and military capabilities might exceed that of the United States some day in the future, China would not reproduce the same favorable conditions that helped establish the US maritime dominance in terms of timing (the two world wars), geography (the US’ own geographical advantages as well as militarybases around the world) and support (allies system and international mobilization ability). If China could see the multi-polarization trend of the sea power pattern and recognize the decline of the American-style maritime hegemony, what it pursues should not be global muscle flexing like the US Navy. From the perspective of necessity, there is neither motivation for China to achieve this. China is a major power based on one continent and bordering one ocean, while the United States is based on one continent and bordering two oceans. Geography determines the differences in their ways of influencing the world. A powerful navy is regarded the pillar of dominating the world by the United States, because Eurasia is the center of world politics, and the United States must deliver resources to Eurasia across the two oceans in order to affect Eurasian affairs and become a world power.34Ronald O’Rourke, “U.S. Grand Strategy and Maritime Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol.138, Issue 1, January 2012.However, China is already located on the Eurasian continent. If China wants to gain influence on the Eurasian continent, it has two major media of land and sea. Therefore, not only China’s geographical environment to become a global maritime military dominant force cannot match that of the United States, but also its motivation is not as strong as that of the US. Of course, as a world power, China needs to build blue water navy and acquire the ability to move in global waters. However, with regard to layout, China should strive to build a strong sea power of“offshore control, regional presence and global influence.” Specifically, China should seek a certain degree of strategic advantage in the contiguous East Asian offshore area, maintain an effective military presence in the Western Pacific and Northern Indian Ocean where its interests are at stake, have a certain operational capacity and ability to exert necessary military influence in other sea areas.

The new trends of international maritime politics are implicitly changing the world.

Hu Bo is Research Fellow at the Institute of Ocean Research, Peking University.