Sharecropping Contract Experience in Delta State， Nigeria

Albert Ukaro Ofuoku

Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension， Delta State University， Asaba Campus PMB 95074， Asaba， Delta State， Nigeria

Sharecropping Contract Experience in Delta State， Nigeria

Albert Ukaro Ofuoku

Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension， Delta State University， Asaba Campus PMB 95074， Asaba， Delta State， Nigeria

Sharecropping has been an age long practice from ancient times. Some scholars saw the practice as being exploitative of the tenants， yet it is still being practiced. The reasons behind it continual practice need to be unveiled. This study was therefore conducted to examine the sharecropping contract experience in Delta State， Nigeria. The landlords decided to practice sharecropping as a result of emigration of their household members， farm size and cost of labours， some of them gave age and their primary occupation as factors for their decisions to opt for sharecropping arrangement. The yields were shared on the basis of 60% for the landlord to 40% for the tenant. The landlords provided all the equipment and inputs， while the tenant's carried out all the farm operations. They faced the constraints of stress， but were able to cope with them， because of hospitals and health centres nearby. The result of the test of hypothesis confirmed the reasons given for deciding on sharecropping arrangement. It was concluded that sharecropping was not exploitative. It was recommended that the practice of sharecropping should be encouraged and not diversified into other sources of livelihood should do so.

sharecropping， contract， Nigeria

Ιntroduction

Sharecropping contract is an agricultural arrangement between a landlord and a tenant. In this case， the tenant pays a fraction of the crop yield to the landlord as rentage. This rentage gives the tenant the right to land given by the landlord. Sharecropping is different from wage contract in which the landlord pays the tenant a wage and keeps the entire crop yield. It is also at variance with the fixed rent contact， whereby the tenant pays the landlord an agreed amount of money as rent， but the tenant has the entire crop yield to himself. The landlord owns the plot of land， he supplies all the inputs and implements used in the farm.

Byres （1983） traced the history of sharecropping to ancient Greece （594-593 BCE）， ancient China （722-481 BCE）， ancient India （fourth century BCE）， and the Roman Empire （61-112 CE）. Amanor and Diderutuah（2001） traced its history in Ghana to the 17th century. However， literature has not been found on its history in the study area and other parts of Nigeria when this study was conducted. Sharecropping has long been criticized by some economists inspired by Karl Marx. These economists include Stightz （1974）， Robertson（1980）， and Pearce （1983）， who considered it as an exploitative contract through which landlords and land holding household exploit tenants who are landless individuals and households. Though the Marxist criticism of sharecropping may be true to the situation in some periods of history and in some parts of the world as pointed out by Reid （1973）， it has not been able to fathom or explain the sustained existence of sharecropping contracts that both parties voluntarily enter into various parts of the world as observed by Bellemare （2006） and in Pakistan by Jacob andMamsuri （2006）， and in other nations by other scholars.

However， sharecropping contract is suspected to be prompted in these contemporary times by rural-urban migration of young adults which has given rise to farm labour scarcity in the rural areas. Most farmers are not financially buoyant enough to hire labour （Ofuoku，2015）. This may cause them to resort to sharecropping contracting with landless farmers. Ofuoku et al. （2014）also found that most farmers were not able to pay for high cost of labours. This prompts them to seek alternative means of continuing with their farming business which is their major source of livelihood.

From the aforementioned information， the tenants in the contract are landless farmers. These landless farmers may be indigenes or migrant farmers.

A comprehension of sharecropping contract in Delta State context is necessary for the fact that many farming household members have emigrated to urban settlements in search of education and white collar jobs， leaving the aged or aging arable crop farming household （HH） heads to carry on with farming business and Delta State government is encouraging people to look beyond oil and go into agricultural production. Pari passu geometric increases in population and economic growth and development are propelling a direct positive relational increasing demand for arable crops products. Major dynamics in arable farming systems will be enhanced. These changes may be tagged as food crop revolution. Sharecropping contract implies that more arable crop farms will be managed by farmers who are not the owners， and the way labour will be organized in Delta State， arable crop farming system will be progressively dictated by sharecropping contracts.

Just as Moritz et al. （2011） opined in the case of pastoral societies in Africa， it may have significant results for arable cropping societies in Africa. Just like Bonfiglioli （1985） as cited by Moritz et al. （2011）suggested， for instance， that WoDaaBe society could no longer be replicated socially as a result of the fact that impoverished pastoralists who worked as hired herders could not participate in livestock exchanges that are an important part of the social system， which is what will repeat itself in case of the sharecropping contract farmers. This may also results to society that may no longer be viable agriculturally.

It is expected that a tenant farmer in the contract arrangement should be able to gradually acquire his or her own plot（s） of farm land and become a landlord. It is， therefore， worthwhile to undertake a study to have knowledge of the experiences of the parties involved in such contracts. This study is also expected to give rise to other studies， aid policy formulation and guide agricultural extension agents in their interactions with their clientele.

Objectives

The major objective of this study was to unveil the experiences of sharecropping contract farmers. Specifically， it sought to:

Ⅰ. Identify the reasons behind landlord's option for sharecropping contract.

Ⅱ. Examine the terms of the contract.

Ⅲ. Ascertain the outcome of the contract.

Ⅳ. Identify the constraints faced in the contract.

Methodology

This study was carried out in Delta State of Nigeria. This state is situated between Longitudes 5' 00 and 6' 45 East of the Greenwich Meridian and Latitudes 5' 00 and 6' 30 North of the Equator. It has a total land mass of 17 440 square kilometers and is constituted by 25 local government areas with an estimated population of about 4 million people （Delta State Government， 2003）. It is shared into three agricultural zones by Delta State Agricultural Development Programme （DTADP）. These zones are Delta North，Central and South Agricultural Zones.

Arable crops， such as cassava， maize， yam and potato， are mostly cultivated by the farmers. Most arable crop farmers derive their livelihoods from farming while some take farming as extra source oflivelihoods.

Data for the study was collected using structured interview scheduled and narratives from stakeholders involved in the sharecropping contract. The stakeholders were the landlords （arable crop farmers who owned the farm land） and the landless farmers. The landlords were chosen from among arable crop farmers who were registered with DTADP.

All the farmers who were identified by DTADP extension supervisors were purposively selected from the farmers' register. The sharecropping contract farmers working with the selected landlord farmers were all also purposively chosen for the study. This led to selection of 291 landlord farmers and 88 sharecropping contract farmers （landless farmers）， giving us a total of 379 respondents （Table 1）. The selections and collection of information were done between February，2014 and March， 2015.

Table 1 Selection of respondent

The data collected was analyzed with the use of descriptive statistics， such as frequency counts and percentages for objectivesⅠ， Ⅱand Ⅲ and Ⅳ were met with means derived from 4-point Likert type scale of strongly agree=4， agree=2 and strongly disagree=1.

The hypothesis was tested with the use of logistic regression. This model was applied， since the dependent variable was dichotomous （Yes or No）. The binary response in this study was whether the landlord farmers were still engaged in sharecropping contract farming or not as used by. The logistic model was implicitly captured， thus:

The empirical model defining decision in favour of sharecropping contract by the ith landlord farmer was explicitly specified:

Where，

Y=Decision in favour of sharecropping contract（dummy）

0=Constant term

X1=Age （years）

X2=Cost of labour （income per annum）

X3=Rural-urban migration of household member（dummy）

X4=Farm size （ha）

X5=Primary occupation （dummy）

?=Error term

The decision in favour of sharecropping contract was regressed against the reasons given by the landlord farmer for his decision.

Results

Reasons for decision in favour of sharecropping arrangement

The most important reason （Table 2） given by the landlord farmers for deciding on sharecropping was rural-urban migration of members of their households （86.60%）. Farm size （69.07%）， cost of farm labours （66.67%）， primary occupation of landlords and minimally the age of the landlord farmers （36.08%） were other reasons that informed their decision to opt for sharecropping arrangement.

Table 2 Reasons for sharecropping arrangement as given by landlords （n=291）

Rural-urban migration of arable crop farming households' members implied depletion of the households' farm labours. Farming household in this context had no option than to hire labours to make up for the labours lost to rural-urban migration （Ofuoku，2015）.

Tuan et al. （2000）， Ekong （2003）， and Adewale（2005） found that there was farm labour shrinkage prompted by the emigration of able-bodied young men from rural to urban areas. There were multiple responses. These caused farming household heads（farmers） to seek for labours outside.

With the shrinked household labour force， the farmer was no longer able to cover the area they used to farm in his farming activities. Meanwhile， farming operations were time-bound. In such situation the farmers had no choice than to employ hired labours so that the farm size could be adequately or totally cultivated. Cost of farm labours tended to be high since farm labours had become scarce as a result of rural-urban migration. Most farmers were not being able to afford the cost farm labours in this scenario. The option left to the farmers was sharecropping arrangement. It was rational to ask of the remittances made to farming household heads by rural-urban migrant members of the households. Ekong （2003），Dustman and Mestres （2010） suggested that most migrants remitted money regularly to their families for farming purpose and rural development， thereby helping to lighten their financial burdens， but Ofuoku（2015） found that for more remittances were made from rural households to rural-urban migrants than from rural-urban migrants to farming households.

There were also some landlords who took arable crop farming as extra source of income. These ones had their primary occupations elsewhere and were always absent. The only alternative left to them was sharecropping arrangement.

Some of them were ageing and so could no

longer work the way they use to do. As a result， they resorted to sharecropping， especially in the presence of emigration of their household members who found it was difficult to make both ends meet in the urban settlements.

Rural-urban migration， age， farm size and primary occupation informed hiring of labours， but the cost of labours was not affordance to the landlords， therefore，they had no option than to decide in favour of sharecropping， especially for food security， income/extra income and security of their heritage （land）.

Terms of contract

Results in Table 3 indicated that landlords and sharecropping contractors shared the crop yields at 60/40 in favour of the landlord （mean=3.32） as part of the contract terms. The landlord provided the planting materials （seeds） （mean=3.41）， implement and tools（mean=3.59）， fertilizers （chemical or organic） （mean= 3.58） and agrochemicals （mean=3.58）， such as herbicides and pesticides.

The tenants/contractors carried out field preparation（mean=4.0）， sowing （mean=3.64）， fertilizer application （mean=3.54）， agrochemicals application （mean= 3.46）， and harvesting （mean=3.58）. The landlords and the tenant farmers separately asserted that they did not share after sales， but shared the yield harvested and that harvesting was done with both parties present. The terms of contract， from the afore-mentioned could not be said to be exploitative. One might be tempted to ask， why cut-off mean=2.50 （＞2.50=term of contract， ＜2.50=not term of contract）.

Table 3 Terns of contract （n=379）

The landlords had a share of 60% of the harvest and the sharecropping contractor was having 40%. The 10% difference might be due for the input provisions made for the farming activities. The contract farmers showed they were satisfied with the contract terms. However， these terms of contract here was at variance with the findings of Amanor and Diderutuah（2001） and Moritz （2011） in Oil Palm and Citrus Belts in Ghana and Northern region of Cameroon，respectively. The terms of contract they have these areas were exploitative. The sustained existence of sharecropping in Delta State， Nigeria was attributable to the unexploitative nature of the contractual terms.

During the narratives， the landlord and the farming contractors at different time opined that the terms of contract were orally drawn. This implied that it was a "gentleman" agreement they had. Since the proceeds were shared in percentage， the implication was that both the landlord and the tenant shared the risk involved.

Outcome of the contract

During the narratives， 95% of the sharecropping farmers said that they had cordial relationships with their landlords and their households. This meant that sharecropping was not exploitative and social mobility was a possibility. Moritz et al. （2011） suggested that labour relations between landlord and the tenant/ contractor/hired labours was a determinant of exploitation and social mobility.

Most （83%） of the tenants were satisfied with the income they made from the sharecropping arrangement. Some （51%） of them had been able to diversify into other source incomes， such as trading and processing； however， they still wanted to continue working with their landlords until they would be able to get others to replace them. Many of them had been working for their landlord for between 5-8 years. All of the above information were indicative of the fact that sharecropping as carried out in the study area was not exploitative in nature and practice.

Constraints faced by sharecropping tenants and coping with them

The most important constraint faced by sharecropping tenants was stress. Stress was a frequent occurrence that increased the expenditure （Scoones， 1998） of sharecropping tenants' households. Another important constraint was shocks. More often than not， stresses led to shocks which， according to Moritz et al. （2011），were highly devastating. In the course of this study， we considered how they were able to manage the stress of ill health in their households.

We inquired about how they would foot the hospital bill of the household member that became ill. In most of the rural settlements， there were health centres that were manned by nurses and nurses' aides.

These health centres were poorly equipped. In cases where they were absent， one existed in a village nearby. They really did not find it difficult to get one of such health facilities. However， there were hospitals in big villages that could easily be reached.

They indicated that they had no challenge coping with the stress of ill health. All of them asserted that they had no problem of transportation to the hospital in case any members of their households were illand that they were able to procure medicines from the hospitals. They said that paying for medicines was difficult initially， but after sometime （their first harvest）， they were able to pay for medicines in the hospital. During the lean period they were aided freely to purchase medicines by their landlords and the landlords' relations. In cases when the tenant was sick and was admitted to bed in the hospital， members of his household， particularly the wife worked in the farm in the farming season.

Test of hypothesis

The results of the logistic regression analysis （Table 4）confirmed that some societal and demographic factors related to the landlord influenced his decision in favour of sharecropping. It indicated that the socio demographic variables explained 90.2 variation in the decision in favour of decision to opt for sharecropping alternative （dependent variable）. Age （X1） of some landlords， cost of labour （X2）， rural-urban migration of landlords HH members （X3）， farm size （X4） and primary occupation （X5） had significant positive relationships with decision of the landlord in favour of sharecropping arrangement. These results were in consonance with a priori expectation. This was a confirmation of the factors given by the landlords as the reasons behind their decisions in favour of sharecropping contract of their farmlands.

Table 4 Estimation of factors that informed landlords' decision in favour of sharecropping contract

Conclusions and Recommendation

This study was carried out in Delta State， Nigeria to examine the sharecropping experience of tenant farmers. Some scholars （economists） viewed it as being exploitative yet the practice was continually extant. However， none has been able to unveil the reason behind its continual practice. In this study，291 landlord farmers and 88 tenants were selected and used. The reasons given by the landlords for sharecropping included emigration of able bodied members of their households to urban areas， farm size and cost of labours. A few of them did because of age.

The term of contract， though orally drawn， spelt it out that the yield was shared on the basis of 60% to the farmer and 40% for the tenant； the landlord provided input， while the tenant carried out all the farm operations. There was harmony between landlords and the tenants.

However， they had constraints， such as stress and illness， but they were able to cope because health centres and hospitals were in or close to the village. The farmers would like to work with their landlords and would want to replace themselves. In consideration of the aforementioned information， the sharecropping arrangement was not exploitative in the study area. It was therefore recommended that:

Ⅰ. Sharecropping should be encouraged as this would create social mobility for tenants and not exploitative to them.

Ⅱ. The tenants that had not diversified into other sources of livelihoods should be encouraged by agricultural extension service to do so.

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F303.4 Document code： A Article lD： 1006-8104（2015）-04-0062-07

Received 8 May 2015

Albert Ukaro Ofuoku， E-mail: albertofuoku@gmail.com