我們與動(dòng)物的相似之處超乎想象

In recent decades， experiments have begun to catch up with what people who work closely with animals have always known – that animals have an inner life， and consciousness isn’t uniquely human.

Consciousness is a concept that is fiendishly（非常地）difficult to define. There have been many attempts： is it awareness， or awareness of that awareness， or self-awareness instead？ But a useful working definition might be that it is any kind of subjective experience， ranging from how we perceive the external world to our inner thoughts and emotions.

Animals differ in their scores for each of these facets of consciousness. Members of the crow family， for example， can be skilled at learning from past experiences. Both octopuses and bees appear to enjoy playing， suggesting they can experience pleasure， linked to the ability to feel the difference between good and bad. The number of animals that pass the famous mirror test – showing that they understand that the animal in the mirror is them， and thus they have a sense of selfhood（自我意識(shí)） – is ever-growing and includes some fish but not dogs.

Findings like this prompted a group of scientists in April to write The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness， which now has over 300 signatories.

As recently as 2012， scientists felt it was necessary to issue a Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness， which stated that “the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness”.

That animals have some form of inner life must surely be self-evident to many people who live or work with them， But， as the biologist Marc Bekoff wrote in New Scientist that he personally feel that attempts to divorce emotion， feeling and experience from how we see animals can be just as unscientific. For too long， we assumed that humans are unique and animals don’t feel pain or emotions the way that we do， a convenient but cruel null hypothesis， when we could have started from the position that perhaps they do instead.

（材料選自New Scientist，有刪改）

1. How does the writer define consciousness？

A. It is awareness， or awareness of that awareness， or self-awareness instead.

B. Consciousness cannot be described in words.

C. It is any kind of subjective experience， ranging from how we perceive the external world to our inner thoughts and emotions.

D. Consciousness is something that all living organisms in the world possess it， including plants.

2. What does the famous mirror test demonstrate？

A. Animals score equally in their scores for each of these facets of consciousness.

B. All animals have self-awareness.

C. Cows can be skilled at learning from past experiences.

D. The animals understand that the animal in the mirror is them， and thus they have a sense of selfhood– is ever-growing and includes some fish but not dogs.

3. What can we learn from the passage？

A. We can view animals from the perspectives of emotions， feelings， and experiences.

B. All animals are unconscious.

C. All animals， like humans， have consciousness.

D. We learn that all mammals and birds， and some other animals like octopuses，do not have the neural machinery needed to generate conscious states and intentional behaviours.

4. What type of article does this article belong to？

A. News and Communication.

B. Science and Culture.

C. Physical health.

D. Literature and Art.

1.C。解析：細(xì)節(jié)理解題。材料第二段提到“意識(shí)是一個(gè)極其難定義的概念。人們嘗試過(guò)多種定義：是覺(jué)知，還是對(duì)覺(jué)知的覺(jué)知，又或者是自我覺(jué)知？但實(shí)用的操作性定義可能是：意識(shí)是任何形式的主觀體驗(yàn)，從感知外部世界到內(nèi)心的思想和情感”。C選項(xiàng)與材料內(nèi)容相符，故選C。

2.D。解析：細(xì)節(jié)理解題。材料第三段的最后一句提到“通過(guò)著名的鏡子測(cè)試的動(dòng)物數(shù)量不斷增加，包括一些魚(yú)，但不包括狗。這表明它們明白鏡子里的動(dòng)物就是自己，因此它們有一種自我意識(shí)”，D選項(xiàng)與材料內(nèi)容相符，故選D。

3.A。解析：推理判斷題。材料最后一段提到“生物學(xué)家Marc Bekoff在《新科學(xué)家》雜志上提出，試圖將情感、感覺(jué)和體驗(yàn)從我們對(duì)動(dòng)物的認(rèn)知中剝離開(kāi)來(lái)，可能同樣是不科學(xué)的”，A選項(xiàng)與材料內(nèi)容相符，故選A。

4.B。解析：主旨大意題。材料的主要內(nèi)容為“動(dòng)物可能和人類一樣，都具有意識(shí)”，由此可知材料屬于科學(xué)文化類的文章，故選B。