China’s Choices in a Changing International Order

Da Wei

The current volatility concerning the character of the international order requires a prolonged period of observation before any accurate conclusions about its dynamics and context can be drawn. In retrospect， the most recent rupture in the international order remains the 2008 international financial crisis. It triggered a fundamental change in the international framework formed after the Cold War， which was largely dominated by the United States， the only remaining superpower， and guided by the ideology of Western liberalism. Trumps four-year tenure and the eruption of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 have further accelerated the disintegration of the existing international order. In the current period of history， we need to transcend the differences between Chinese and Western political and academic discourse， and instead accurately identify the directional changes the international order is undergoing. This will enable us to position China in such a way that a new international order more favorable for China can be achieved.

Similarities and Differences： International Order in Chinese and Western Discourse Systems

An order consists of a set of arrangements which define the boundaries of different actors in human society， and it describes a kind of stable behavioral pattern which guides the relationships between various actors in a society.We all find ourselves in such an order， and our behavior is bound by these arrangements. Within a particular order， people know what they may or may not do， what they will be rewarded for， and what they will be punished for. From this perspective， the international order is a regulated set of behavioral patterns and relationships formed among different countries in the world， and it is also an arrangement to define the boundaries of action for countries within the international system. An international order is achieved sometimes through concepts commonly accepted by all actors， and sometimes through more formal rules or mechanisms. When international actors accept the same set of patterns of conduct and relations， the international order tends to be more stable and international relations function with less friction. If， however， parties try to break existing relations and patterns of behavior， the international order becomes more volatile， and international relations can deteriorate even to the point where war may break out. Former American politician Henry Kissinger had similar views on this question， as he argued that an international order is based “on two components： a set of commonly accepted rules that define the limits of permissible action and a balance of power that enforces restraint where rules break down， preventing one political unit from subjugating all others.”1

Regarding the current international order， the Chinese government and state leaders frequently refer to “the UN-centered international system，” and“the international order underpinned by international law.”2 The expression“international order underpinned by international law” highlights the role of international rules in generating and maintaining the international order. In addition， the Chinese government and media often use the rather neutral term “current international order，” which on the surface does not underline the significance of power， rules or values for international relations. However， when elaborating on the content of the term， Chinese officials do emphasize the meaning of rules， like in this example： “The current international order is jointly established by the international community with the UN at its core， and purposes and principles of the UN Charter as its basis. Its basic principle is that all countries should respect each others sovereignty and territorial integrity， treat each other as equals and refrain from interfering in each others internal affairs.”3 The phrase “current international order，” as used in this statement， relates to a set of behavior patterns and relations formed among modern sovereign states after World War II. This perspective of the international order is a kind of “l(fā)imited realistic view of the international order，” where the element of realism is represented by the fact that this view recognizes nation-states as the basic units of international relations. The term “l(fā)imited” implies that anarchy， power competition and insecurity in international politics can be kept under control by institutional arrangements among nation-states. This institutional arrangement was born with the Westphalian system in the 17th century and reached its maturity after World War II.

Unlike Chinas view of the international order， the Western world， represented foremost by the United States， often uses the term “l(fā)iberal international order.” Western academic circles have discussed this liberal international order from three vantage points： its evolutionary history， its system design， and the values it represents.

First， from the perspective of its evolutionary history， Western scholars argue that with the rise of liberal nations as represented by the United Kingdom and the United States after the 19th century， these two countries began to internationalize its liberal ideas， such as open trade， the gold standard and freedom of navigation. This perception of order was later put to paper in the “Fourteen Points” after World War I and in the Atlantic Charter during World War II. After the end of World War II， the major victorious powers tried to create a common international system， but soon after the outbreak of the Cold War， the Western side began to establish its own institutions， rules and norms， which then evolved into the liberal international order.4 After the 1970s， the liberal international order gradually expanded beyond the Western countries. According to Western understanding， after the end of the Cold War， the liberal international order expanded into a global order.

Second， considering its institutional design， Western scholars believe that the liberal international order is composed of a series of complex and sometimes even conflicting international systems. A study by the RAND Corporation， an American think tank， grouped those systems into three broad categories. The first category includes international economic systems， such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade （GATT） and its successor the World Trade Organization （WTO）， the World Bank， the International Monetary Fund （IMF）， the Group of Seven （G7）， and the Group of 20 （G20）. Other arrangements consist of important regional and bilateral economic treaties and international development agencies under the United Nations framework. The main goal of these international economic systems is to eliminate barriers and obstacles for international economic exchanges. The second category is political-military arrangements which include several collective security institutions that deal with arms control and confidence-building measures， important regional organizations such as the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations （ASEAN）， various alliance systems， etc. The main purpose of these regimes is to prevent large-scale invasions and to limit the use of force by states. The third category is made up of legal institutions and mechanisms for solving targeted problems. This includes norms， treaties and systems in the field of human rights under the framework of the United Nations. It also consists of a wide range of functional institutional arrangements， such as the global climate regime， and international standards， agreements and organizations for various industries， which serve to provide for better governance of human society.5

Third， regarding its system of values， the liberal international order emphasizes the supremacy of Western liberalism. There are three main manifestations of liberal values in the international order. The first one is to underline “openness.” As a political philosophy based on an individualistic theorem， liberalism emphasizes that individuals rather than countries are the basic units and ultimate justification of the international order. The second one is to emphasize “rules，” highlighting the predominant role of international organizations， international rules and mechanisms， and underlining multilateralism， negotiation， consultation， and consensus in diplomatic practice. The third one is to claim the sole “l(fā)egitimacy” of Western liberal ideas， assuming that it represents the main development direction of history. The combination of all those ideas has led to the rise of viewpoints such as “the end of history，” “human rights above sovereignty”and “responsibility to protect.” As a result， many countries in the world have generally reduced or even eliminated state controls of economic and social activities over the past decades， lowered transaction costs， and facilitated the flow of capital， technology， personnel and information， in order to benefit from the expansion of economic globalization. In terms of global governance， the liberal concept of international order also stresses the openness of global commons such as oceans and the internet， aiming to prevent any nation-state from imposing sovereignty over these domains.

A comparison between the views of China and Western countries such as the United States concerning the international order shows that the two sides use completely different terms when referring to and describing the international order， although they are not diametrically opposed. Despite their varying opinions on the matter， China， the United States and other Western countries have since the 1970s been increasingly subject to the same set of international systems and the global order associated with it. A careful examination of how the two sides assess the current international orders historical evolution， institutional design and implicit values will demonstrate that their views of the current international order have both similarities and differences； furthermore， that the similarities are notably greater than the differences.

Seen from a historical perspective， what China calls the “international order underpinned by international law” and what the West calls the “l(fā)iberal international order” both have their roots in the international system jointly established by the major victorious countries， including China and the United States， after World War II. Chinas involvement was initially blocked for more than two decades after the founding of the Peoples Republic of China， but since the 1970s， China has been gradually integrated into the international system and participated in its development and construction. Despite the use of different attributes， major powers such as China and the United States have built the current international order together. However， the key difference in how China and Western countries interpret the historical evolution of the international order is that China emphasizes its role as one of the founders of the current international order after the end of World War II， while Western countries such as the United States tend to think that China has been merely “invited” to join as a “l(fā)atecomer” after its reform and opening-up.

A closer look at what Western countries call the “l(fā)iberal international order” reveals considerable similarities with how the current international order is seen by China. From the Chinese perspective， the United Nations and its affiliated agencies， the World Trade Organization， the International Monetary Fund， the World Bank， important regional trade and investment liberalization arrangements， and various arms control treaties and climate change agreements are all part of the current international order based on international law. From the Western standpoint， those are also components of the liberal international order. At the same time， there are of course differences in how China and the United States view certain elements which make up the international order. For example， although China does not oppose the US military alliance system， it obviously does not regard these agreements as a mandatory part of the international order. Similarly， several international organizations and institutions advocated by China and other countries， such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank， are not considered by the US to be part of the liberal international order.6 Furthermore， even if both China and the US accept certain international norms， their interpretations often vary greatly. For example， both countries support the principle of “freedom of navigation，” but they have very different understandings concerning the innocent passage of foreign warships in territorial waters and the right to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones.

In terms of its inherent values， the emphasis on “rules” within the current international order has by and large ensured the relative fairness of the international system. Although international rules still mainly reflect the influence of powerful countries， they do not enjoy unlimited leeway and have to respect a fundamental amount of fairness and compromise within the international order. The reason why the Trump administration was eager to withdraw from international organizations is related to the inability of the United States to act as they please in the international system. Meanwhile， the liberal principle of “openness” has greatly promoted the development of globalization. This process has brought enormous benefits to countries such as China and the United States， and has made China an active participant and supporter of globalization. Since Chinas peaceful development within the international system in the late 1970s， the size of its economy and the living standards of its 1.4 billion people have surpassed those of many other countries in the world. In terms of national comprehensive strength， the gap between China and the United States has been closing at an accelerating rate. Such conditions for peaceful development would have been difficult to achieve in previous international environments that were shaped mainly by the use of force. In other words， the current international order provides unprecedented tolerance for national development. However， although Western countries internationalization of economic liberalism has been welcomed by China， it cannot accept other liberal ideas， especially political liberalism. China believes that countries should be allowed to choose their own development paths， without being forced to accept Western values that are imposed upon sovereign states.

To sum up， there are similarities and differences in Chinese and Western discourse systems on the international order， and the similarities outweigh the differences. China actually agrees with many specific ideas and policies derived from Western liberalism. As Hans Kundnani pointed out， it is not so much that China and Russia want to undermine the liberal international order， but that they are advocating a different version of the liberal order and are opposed to efforts by Western countries in recent years to realign the order in the direction of human rights and other fields.7 The core difference between Chinese and Western views regarding the international order lies in the intended role for nation-states. China believes that nationstates are the basic units of the international order and opposes any excessive weakening of their power. In other words， China supports the formation of a realistic order， based on agreements between equal sovereign states， with certain liberal characteristics. In contrast， the United States supports a USled international order which enables the principles of Western liberalism to permeate all levels of the world community， including the individual level.

Rupture and Reconstruction： Crisis and Evolution of the International Order

After the eruption of the financial crisis in 2008， the existing international order has been confronted with a growing number of challenges. On the one hand， Western countries declared that the rise of emerging powers such as China and Russia is posing a serious threat to the current international order. On the other hand， various policies launched by the Trump administration and events such as Brexit have also shaken the foundation of the current global system from within the Western world.

The first contradiction surrounding the current international order is that some Western powers perceive the rise of non-Western countries represented by China and Russia as a challenge to the order. China， however， has a very clear and consistent standpoint regarding the relationship between its own development and the current order： “China will continue its efforts to safeguard world peace， contribute to global development， and uphold international order.”8 It is because the domestic political and economic systems of China， Russia and other nations differ significantly from those of Western liberal countries， that the West regards the rise of China and Russia as an inevitable challenge to the current international order.9 Guided by this mindset， Western leaders have radically realigned their policies toward China and Russia in recent years， which has led to serious tensions within the current international order.

This perspective of Western countries raises two major questions concerning the international order.

First， does the current international order under any circumstances have to be led by the United States and the West？ In fact， even American scholars themselves admit that the so-called “l(fā)iberal international order” in the Western sense actually has quite hegemonic characteristics.10 Since the beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union， the US has viewed many of the institutional arrangements of the post-war international order as part of its Cold War strategy. The NSC-68 document，an important policy paper issued by the US National Security Council in April 1950， comprehensively expounded the containment strategy of the US. In this document， the US government proposed establishing rules， norms， systems and multilateral cooperation throughout the world， and regarded it as the most powerful tool to contain the Soviet Union.11 American scholars do not deny the close connection between the establishment of the liberal international order and the promotion of American national interests.12 Thus， when Americas capability of leading the current international system declines， the Western world tends to think that the entire order has been thrown into a crisis.

Second， although the current international order has many liberal characteristics， does it have to be an exclusive “club” composed only of countries that pursue Western liberal political and economic policies at home？ In other words， is liberalism a value orientation that applies to the current international order itself， or is it merely an identity requirement of those countries that are “qualified” to become members of this international order？ If liberalism refers to the principle of behavior toward global partners， then any country should be able to participate in the construction of this order as long as its international behavior and the norms it advocates embody the principle of openness and being rules-based. This is by all means acceptable to China. However， to give a practical example from the recent past， when China proposed the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and promoted cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative， the US government and strategic elite generally adopted a skeptical and even dismissive attitude. One reason for this conduct is that American strategic circles regard the status of a “l(fā)iberal country” as a “qualification” for building an international order. China does not meet this status in their eyes， so it does not have this “qualification.”

The second contradiction relating to the current international order is that the Western world itself is increasingly dissatisfied with it. In fact， Western countries themselves have become the biggest challengers of the current international order. As globalization saw unprecedented expansion in the past three to four decades， developed capitalist countries have exported large quantities of capital and technology to other regions of the world， especially emerging market countries， stretching industrial， value and supply chains all over the world. At the same time， the benefits brought about by globalization have failed to yield sufficient positive returns for developed countries， especially for people with low- and middle-income in these countries. Countries with large populations such as China and India were fully integrated into the global division of labor after the end of the Cold War， creating an absorption effect on the manufacturing and service industries in the US and Europe. In the course of technological innovation and increased digitalization， the threshold for a rapid replication of technological changes has been significantly lowered since the 1990s， which further accelerates the industrial outflow from developed countries. Faced with a widening gap between the rich and the poor and with worsening social contradictions， voters in the US and European countries have sought to get rid of their domestic predicament through leadership changes and institutional reforms. In fact， the election of Barack Obama as a political newcomer with little political experience in 2008， and the electoral victory of Donald Trump as a political amateur relying on populism in 2016 were both results of domestic economic and social polarization in the US.

After the financial crisis of 2008， President Obama and President Trump have both tried to strengthen the role of the state and the government in economic and social spheres， so as to protect the vulnerable groups at home from the adverse effects of globalization. The Obama administrations introduction of a universal health care， the launch of the National Export Initiatives， the promotion of manufacturing reflow and the passage of the Buy American Act by the US Congress were all manifestations of this trend. In this respect， the Trump administration has taken more radical steps. It withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership （TPP）， renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement （NAFTA）， pushed aside the World Trade Organization， and exerted strong pressure on China in the areas of economy， trade， science and technology. The ultimate goal of all these policies is to strengthen the role of the state and the government and reestablish the physical borders （such as the US-Mexico border wall） and intangible barriers（such as higher tariffs， stricter immigration policies， and more national security review mechanisms for foreign investment） between countries to be able to control the impact of globalization.

Bidens victory in the 2020 presidential election may reverse some of rumps extreme measures to a certain extent， but US policy at large will T under no circumstances return to what it was before 2016 or even before 2008. Jake Sullivan， who is now serving as National Security Advisor in the Biden administration， wrote in June 2018， “Its not the 1990s anymore. People want the government to help solve big problems.” According to Sullivan， the Democratic Party should proceed from the left-wing policy assumptions of the “Old Democrats” （referring to the progressive Democrats and the traditional New Deal Democrats）， transform them to adapt to the characteristics and conditions of the current era， and formulate the Democratic Partys answer to the problems facing the United States.13 The platform adopted by the National Convention of the Democratic Party in 2020 also contained policy proposals such as supporting domestic manufacturing sector， and withholding public investments for companies that outsource job opportunities to foreign countries.14 Going forward， the Biden administration could take three different directions in economic relations between the United States and the world. The first is to more or less maintain the existing relationship between the US and the world economy while at the same time making some minor corrections. However， this option may not satisfy the various domestic segments that currently bear the impact of economic globalization. The second would be to achieve a higher degree of economic liberalization arrangements between the US and other developed countries， with China and other countries being either excluded or forced to meet the standards exclusively set by the US. However， the domestic political environment in the US may not be ready to accept such a higher level of economic liberalization arrangements. The third option is to adopt some degree of nationalist economic practices by promoting domestic innovation， boosting domestic industries and implementing protectionist trade measures. If the Biden administration adopts one of the latter two routes， it will have a renewed impact on the current international order.

Identifying and Shaping the Trend： Chinas Choices in a Changing International Order

In the past 40 years， Chinas economy and society have made remarkable progress within the current international order. As its beneficiary， China is satisfied with the current international order as a whole， and intends to safeguard its stability while at the same time making its own contributions to its continued development， reform and improvement. However， the changes that are taking place in the international order are not simply dependent on Chinas will. The fact that major changes will occur is a matter of certainty， but how to identify the direction of these changes， take advantage of the trend， and promote the evolution of the international order toward a more just and reasonable direction is a challenge China needs to consider.

The first challenge is to guarantee stability in the evolution of the current international order. Shifts within the international order itself are unstoppable， but one important task facing China may be to make the process more stable and the changes less disruptive. Therefore， it is necessary to consider how to avoid major ruptures in the existing international order and avert serious conflicts during its evolution. For example， if the economies and societies of China and the United States were completely decoupled， or if the international order would gradually evolve into “islands” or “orbits，”15 or if a serious confrontation and conflict between major powers was to erupt， the existing international order would be exposed to massive upheavals. In the event of such a major emergency， the time for China to react to the global situation would be extremely limited. Regardless of the actual future development of the international system， China always has to coexist with other major countries in a common global context. This demands that global major powers， especially China and the United States， seek strategic consensus on the evolution of the international order， exercise restraint， and avoid decisions and actions that may lead to any abrupt distortions of the order.

The second challenge is to strike the right balance between liberalism and realism in the future international order. As mentioned above， the Western developed countries have been seeking a completely liberalized order， while China is more accustomed to a realistic order with certain aspects of liberalism. At present， the United States and other developed countries are making efforts to alleviate the disadvantages brought about by unrestrained globalization by strengthening the role of nation-states. As far as the general direction is concerned， this is partially consistent with Chinas propositions. If handled properly， the two countries may expand their consensus and find a new balance between liberalism and realism acceptable to both sides. However， in this process， China may encounter three challenges. First， if the United States and a small number of its allies are determined to build a liberal international order which excludes countries such as China， the international order will face the possibility of further breakdown. The Trans-Pacific Partnership （TPP） promoted by the Obama administration and the Summit for Democracy advocated by Biden are attempts in this regard. Second， should Western countries be determined to abandon their liberal agendas， then the liberal elements in the current international order， which has been so conducive to Chinas development，would be also discarded， as exemplified by the many obstacles set by the Trump administration to free trade and technology transfer. Third， when the economic and foreign policies of Western countries are becoming more and more geared to their national interests， competition among nation-states may intensify， and China will face head-on competition from Western countries（if， for example， the US government develops its own industrial policies and innovation policies to compete with China）. Therefore， in the future， China can seek to expand consensus with Western countries on the proper relationship between the government and the market. At the same time， China also needs to take steps to uphold the liberal elements of the existing order， especially in the economic field， to make its domestic circulation interlock more effectively with the international circulation， and better maintain the integration of， and balance between， realism and liberalism contained in the international order.