“通而不暢”
——東盟互聯(lián)互通的一大軟肋

□ 文/克里斯·哈特利

“通而不暢”
——東盟互聯(lián)互通的一大軟肋

□ 文/克里斯·哈特利

信息通信技術(shù)的推廣被認(rèn)為具有聚合功能，可實(shí)現(xiàn)城市和工業(yè)區(qū)的跨國(guó)連通，對(duì)地緣政治局勢(shì)也有一定的緩和作用。東盟的許多發(fā)展中國(guó)家已著手提高城鎮(zhèn)化和全球化的發(fā)展速度，而信息通信技術(shù)則是下一個(gè)發(fā)展前沿。然而，東盟各國(guó)在寬帶穩(wěn)定性和寬帶普及率兩方面相差懸殊。因此，加強(qiáng)信息通信技術(shù)區(qū)域合作和寬帶基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)，有利于打造像剛成立不久的“東盟經(jīng)濟(jì)共同體”那樣的陣營(yíng)：既具有緊密的組織架構(gòu)，又具有全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。

東盟各國(guó)信息化水平，參差不齊

東盟各國(guó)移動(dòng)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的發(fā)展，勢(shì)頭迅猛；然而，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)普及率卻仍存在明顯差距。柬埔寨、越南和泰國(guó)3個(gè)東盟國(guó)家的移動(dòng)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)覆蓋率最高，另外，有8個(gè)東盟國(guó)家已超過(guò)世界平均水平。最近，聯(lián)合國(guó)亞洲及太平洋地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)與社會(huì)委員會(huì)公布的數(shù)據(jù)透露，東盟國(guó)家的寬帶普及率仍落后于東亞和東北亞國(guó)家。從每千人口固定寬帶接入率來(lái)看，新加坡在整個(gè)東盟地區(qū)排名第一，達(dá)到26.5%；泰國(guó)和馬來(lái)西亞分別位列東盟第二(9.2%)和第三(9.0%)，遠(yuǎn)不及新加坡；越南和文萊分別位列東盟第四(8.1%)和第五(8.0%)。相比之下，緬甸、老撾、柬埔寨、印度尼西亞和菲律賓5個(gè)東盟國(guó)家的固定寬帶發(fā)展滯后，其每千人口固定寬帶接入率依次為0.3%、0.5%、0.5%、1.1%和3.4%；以同種方式計(jì)算，這5個(gè)東盟國(guó)家在亞太地區(qū)排名墊底。

當(dāng)然，東盟國(guó)家的固定寬帶發(fā)展也呈現(xiàn)出了良好的發(fā)展跡象。2005～2015年，文萊、馬來(lái)西亞和泰國(guó)的固定寬帶普及率得到明顯提高，而東盟其他國(guó)家固定寬帶的發(fā)展前景則較為黯淡。2008～2014年，雖然菲律賓、泰國(guó)、越南和柬埔寨等東盟國(guó)家改善了電信基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，但政府在線服務(wù)的發(fā)展甚至呈現(xiàn)出倒退跡象。

而在新一代信息技術(shù)應(yīng)用新突破方向——物聯(lián)網(wǎng)的建設(shè)上，東盟則更為滯后。通常情況下，M2M終端規(guī)模是衡量物聯(lián)網(wǎng)發(fā)展水平的重要指標(biāo)。按這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)看，世界發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體在這方面做得最好。對(duì)東盟國(guó)家而言，只有加強(qiáng)固定寬帶的互聯(lián)互通，才能在物聯(lián)網(wǎng)等全球尖端科技的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中占有一席之地。

齊心協(xié)力，同舟共濟(jì)

由于各國(guó)堅(jiān)持獨(dú)立發(fā)展寬帶業(yè)務(wù)，網(wǎng)絡(luò)速度呈現(xiàn)出明顯的地區(qū)差異化。對(duì)于工作中需要用到互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的大多數(shù)人來(lái)說(shuō)，工作效率受網(wǎng)絡(luò)速度的影響明顯。就網(wǎng)絡(luò)速度而言，東盟和中國(guó)內(nèi)地落后于世界排名前十的韓國(guó)、日本和中國(guó)香港。

如今，移動(dòng)應(yīng)用程序的應(yīng)用范圍越來(lái)越廣，移動(dòng)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的發(fā)展?jié)摿蛣?chuàng)業(yè)規(guī)模也日益凸顯。對(duì)東盟國(guó)家而言，完善寬帶互聯(lián)互通所需的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施,讓各國(guó)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)速度達(dá)到平衡，是當(dāng)務(wù)之急。把這一倡議納入東盟現(xiàn)行的合作機(jī)制是可行之策，有利于縮小東盟國(guó)家與亞洲、歐洲以及北美等地區(qū)寬帶互聯(lián)互通程度高的國(guó)家之間的差距。

《東盟信息通信技術(shù)總體方案（2020）》提出三大倡議：完善信息及通信基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施互聯(lián)互通；控制災(zāi)難威脅；提升云計(jì)算能力。該方案旨在減少區(qū)域差異、加強(qiáng)協(xié)調(diào)與配合，但并未針對(duì)寬帶連接速度、寬帶普及率和寬帶可靠性等方面的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀，制定明確的區(qū)域性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和發(fā)展目標(biāo)。不過(guò)，東盟各國(guó)決策者們對(duì)與信息通信技術(shù)相關(guān)的規(guī)則、管理、教育等要素予以關(guān)注，將助推基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)成為轉(zhuǎn)型的催化劑。東盟擁有很強(qiáng)的戰(zhàn)略協(xié)調(diào)性、統(tǒng)一的行為規(guī)范以及適用于境內(nèi)和跨境基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的融資機(jī)制，有望發(fā)展成為全球首個(gè)信息通信技術(shù)集群。

前進(jìn)的道路上充滿挑戰(zhàn)。打造區(qū)域?qū)拵ЩA(chǔ)設(shè)施平臺(tái)，需要全面把握制約各大公共工程項(xiàng)目發(fā)展的突出瓶頸：既涉及融資機(jī)制和地理環(huán)境問(wèn)題，又涉及地方和國(guó)家政治問(wèn)題。另外，通過(guò)制定區(qū)域發(fā)展規(guī)劃來(lái)加強(qiáng)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)，使制度建設(shè)和規(guī)范化管理變得更為復(fù)雜。例如，落實(shí)東南亞區(qū)域鐵路走廊的倡議，需要所有沿線國(guó)家的共同參與——如果沿線發(fā)展水平較高的國(guó)家完成了其境內(nèi)路段的建設(shè)，而其他沿線國(guó)家卻陷入政治和管理困境，那么所有沿線國(guó)家將沒(méi)有任何共同利益可言。信息通信技術(shù)的發(fā)展，亦是如此。

未來(lái)，新增的海底電纜系統(tǒng)具有投資吸引力，高效協(xié)作機(jī)制建設(shè)的緊迫性與日俱增。為了防止東盟各國(guó)寬帶發(fā)展的差距進(jìn)一步拉大，應(yīng)著力加強(qiáng)寬帶基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)，并將其作為一種區(qū)域資源加以管理。東盟經(jīng)濟(jì)共同體剛成立不久，制度建設(shè)和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)關(guān)乎東盟的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展；為了弘揚(yáng)集體主義精神，東盟各國(guó)人民應(yīng)為此盡自己的一份力。如果與周邊國(guó)家“通而不暢”，且沒(méi)有實(shí)力相當(dāng)?shù)母?jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，那么就算是東盟最發(fā)達(dá)的國(guó)家也難以實(shí)現(xiàn)更大的發(fā)展。

·許志亮 編譯

·來(lái)源：美國(guó)《外交官》雜志

E arly last year, Poppy S. Winanti and I wrote about China’s increased investment in ASEAN, especially Indonesia, and whether China can behave responsibly. Since thenThe Jakarta Posthas published a number of expert opinions on Indonesia and China relations, from the fear of China’s rise as a regional hegemon to a balanced view on China, dispelling such a fear.

But less has been said about one question: why do Indonesia and ASEAN matter to China? What drives China to put billions of dollars in Indonesia following various multilateral and bilateral agreements at the ASEAN level and between Indonesia and China? In 2016, China became the third largest investor in Indonesia after Japan and Singapore.

After the signing of the Indonesia China strategic partnership in 2005 and the upgrade into a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013, China is now Indonesia’s largest trading partner. What does it mean to be a strategic partner for China?

One should note that since the early 2000s, China has signed strategic partnership agreements with 47 countries and three international organizations in which ASEAN is one of them. Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing (2014) argue that the boom of China’s strategic partnerships is a result of China’s embrace of globalization and multi-dimensional diplomacy. It is a diplomatic instrument to secure China’s core interests and its peaceful rise as a global power.

A comprehensive strategic partnership, as articulated by the then Chinese premier Wen Jiabao in 2004, is an all-dimensional and multilayered, long-term and stable partnership that transcends differences in ideologies and social systems. It seeks to expand converging interests and seek common ground on the major issues while shelving differences on the minor ones. Along with Indonesia, other ASEAN members who have signed strategic partnerships with China are Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Malaysia.

The strategic partnership is used by China as a diplomatic tool to protect its core interests, which include state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification. These core interests are reflected well in all documents of China’s strategic partnerships.

The question then is, why do Indonesia and ASEAN more broadly deserve a position as China’s strategic partner? I would strongly argue that it is to protect China’s core interest, its national security. In this case, it is to secure its energy supply. Energy security for China, as Downs wrote in 2006, means the acquisition of sufficient energy supplies to protect China’s core objectives.

In recent years China has emerged as a global player in the energy sector. This is a result of soaring economic growth, hovered between 9 and 10 percent per year for three decades since 1980. And since 2012 China still shows impressive growth at a rate of 7 to 8 percent. This is why China’s demand for energy is massive and propels the country to undertake energy acquisitions worldwide. Domestic energy in China is scarce except in coal, but with low quality.

China became a net oil importer in 1993, a net gas importer in 2007, a net coal importer in 2008 and the first global oil importer in 2014. It means that in 2014, China has become a consumer of 30 percent of global oil consumption and 45 percent of global coal consumption. Given this enormous energy demand, China has no other option but to go overseas to secure energy supply.

Why is ASEAN strategic for China? It is because about 60 percent of China’s oil import is transported through the Strait of Malacca. A strategic partnership with ASEAN will help mitigate the risks of disruptions in China’s energy transport from piracy, congested traffic, terrorist attacks and especially the naval forces of othermajor powers like the United States and Japan.

One way to mitigate the risk in the Strait of Malacca is the construction of the oil and gas pipeline from Maday Island in Myanmar to Yunan Province in China, which has been operational since 2015. It has cut by 30 percent the time needed to transport crude oil to China and reduced the risk of piracy and other risks. Also in November last year, China and Malaysia signed deals on defense.

The two parties also agreed to resolve the South China Sea case on a bilateral basis. This further secures China’s energy interest in the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea.

ASEAN countries encompass all of China’s energy shipping routes from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Therefore, it is in China’s core interest to maintain peace and stability in the region and seek closer economic cooperation with ASEAN member countries including Indonesia.

When he came to power in 2014, President Joko“Jokowi” Widodo projected Indonesia as a maritime power and this has become central in Indonesia-China relations since 2015. It sits well with China’s Maritime Silk Road ambition.

Indonesia’s diplomacy toward China can be further improved to mutually benefit the two parties when we understand why Indonesia and ASEAN matter to China.

Emanuel Bria

Asia Pacific senior officer and Indonesia Country manager at the Natural Resource Governance Institute

·Source:The Jakarta Post

Why Do Indonesia, ASEAN Matter to China?

By Emanuel Bria

On March 27, 2015, Mr. Jiang Zengwei (Left 3rd), Chairman of China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, met with Suryo Bambang Sulisto, Chairman of Indonesian Industry and Commerce Chamber (KADIN) (Right 3rd) and exchanged views on cooperation between both countries’companies.