第七屆“華政杯”全國(guó)法律翻譯大賽初賽試題參考譯文1

第七屆“華政杯”全國(guó)法律翻譯大賽初賽試題參考譯文1

試題1（586words）

T he court orders injunctive relief against the defendant and agrees to maintain jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the settlement is followed. Injunctive relief is a remedy imposed by a court in which a party is instructed to do or not do something. Failure to obey the order may lead the court to fi nd the party in Contempt and to impose other penalties. Plaintiffs in lawsuits generally prefer consent decrees because they have the power of the court behind the agreements; defendants who wish to avoid publicity also tend to prefer such agreements because they limit the exposure of damaging details. Critics of consent decrees argue that federal district courts assert too much power over the defendant. They also contend that federal courts have imposed conditions on state and local governments in Civil Rights Cases that usurp the power of the states.

法院（向原告）提供針對(duì)被告的禁令救濟(jì)，并同意維持對(duì)案件的管轄，以確保和解協(xié)議得到履行。禁令救濟(jì)是法院給予的一種救濟(jì)形式，要求一方當(dāng)事人為或不為某事。當(dāng)事人不遵守法院的命令，可構(gòu)成藐視法庭，并被法院施加其他處罰。

一般而言，訴訟中的原告更加青睞同意令，因?yàn)榉ㄔ涸跒楹徒鈪f(xié)議進(jìn)行“背書”；不愿意引起公眾關(guān)注的被告也傾向于使用同意令，因?yàn)檫@將限制對(duì)其不利的細(xì)節(jié)的曝光程度。同意令的批評(píng)者則認(rèn)為，聯(lián)邦地區(qū)法院對(duì)被告行使了過(guò)多的權(quán)力。批評(píng)者還認(rèn)為，在民權(quán)案件中，聯(lián)邦法院對(duì)州政府及地方政府強(qiáng)加了太多的（限制）條件，僭越了各州的權(quán)力。

Most civil lawsuits are settled before going to trial and most settlements are private agreements between the parties. Typically, the plaintiff will fi le a motion to dismiss the case once the settlement agreement has been signed. The court then issues a dismissal order and the case is closed. However, if the defendant does not live up to the terms of the settlement agreement the plaintiff cannot reactivate the old lawsuit.

In more complex civil lawsuits that involve the conduct of business or industry, and in actions by the government against businesses that have allegedly violated regulatory laws, consent decrees are regularly part of the settlement agreement. A court will maintain jurisdiction and oversight to make sure the terms of the agreement are executed. The threat of a contempt order may keep defendants from dragging their feet or seeking to evade the intent of the agreement. In addition, the terms of the settlement are public.

大多數(shù)民事訴訟案件在庭審之前就已達(dá)成和解，并且大多數(shù)和解是通過(guò)當(dāng)事人私下協(xié)議所達(dá)成的。一般而言，一旦簽訂和解協(xié)議，原告將向法院提交撤銷案件的動(dòng)議申請(qǐng)。隨后，法院將發(fā)出撤銷令，案件終結(jié)。然而，如果被告不遵守和解協(xié)議的條款，原告將不能重新提起上述已被撤銷的案件。

在涉及企業(yè)或行業(yè)行為的更加復(fù)雜的民事訴訟中，以及在政府對(duì)被指控違反了監(jiān)管法律的企業(yè)所提起的訴訟中，同意令通常是和解協(xié)議的一部分。法院將保持對(duì)案件的管轄權(quán)，并對(duì)其進(jìn)行監(jiān)督，以確保和解協(xié)議的條款能夠得到執(zhí)行。藐視法庭的判令可避免被告怠于履行協(xié)議，或試圖逃避執(zhí)行和解協(xié)議。此外，和解協(xié)議的條款是公開(kāi)的。

特定類型的訴訟要求法院必須發(fā)布同意令。對(duì)于集體訴訟的和解協(xié)議而言，《聯(lián)邦程序規(guī)則》（Federal Rules of Procedure）第23條要求聯(lián)邦地區(qū)法院必須在批準(zhǔn)和解協(xié)議提議之前，確定其公平性、充分性和合理性。根據(jù)《反托拉斯程序和處罰法》（Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act）的規(guī)定：在反托拉斯訴訟中，法院必須對(duì)司法部提交的同意令提議進(jìn)行審查。該法要求法院對(duì)特定的條款進(jìn)行審查；審查的內(nèi)容包括該法院令是否促進(jìn)了公共利益。

Certain types of lawsuits require a court to issue a consent decree. In Class Action settlements, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Procedure mandates that a federal district court must determine whether a proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable before approving it. Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, the court must review proposedconsent decrees in antitrust suits filed by the Justice Department. The statute directs the court to review certain items, including whether the decree advances the public interest.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a case that consent decrees “have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees.” The division between contracts and judicial decrees suggests that consent decrees are contracts that resolve some issues through the consent of the parties. However, for some issues, the decree contains judicial acts rendered by the judge, not the parties. Commentators have noted that these dual attributes require a court to determine when it is appropriate to“rubber-stamp” a proposed settlement and when it is more appropriate for the court to treat the proposal as it would any judicial order.

美國(guó)聯(lián)邦最高法院在某案中判決，同意令“兼具契約和司法命令的屬性”。契約和司法命令的分野則意味著：“和解協(xié)議的法院令”是通過(guò)當(dāng)事人的合意來(lái)解決某些爭(zhēng)議的契約。然而，對(duì)于一些爭(zhēng)議性問(wèn)題而言，該命令是法官做出的司法行為，而非當(dāng)事人的（行為）。有評(píng)論者已經(jīng)注意到，同意令的上述雙重特征就要求法院確定在何種情況下適宜“不經(jīng)審查便批準(zhǔn)”當(dāng)事方提出的和解協(xié)議，何種情況下更適宜將（批準(zhǔn)）和解提議視為司法命令。

有人批評(píng)聯(lián)邦法院使用同意令去改革監(jiān)獄系統(tǒng)、學(xué)校系統(tǒng)，以及其他政府機(jī)構(gòu)。一些法院多年來(lái)對(duì)這些機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行監(jiān)管，并且對(duì)州政府和地方政府施加一些耗資巨大的條件。國(guó)會(huì)通過(guò)了《1995年監(jiān)獄訴訟改革法》（Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995），試圖干預(yù)此類訴訟。該法對(duì)聯(lián)邦法院通過(guò)使用同意令去改善監(jiān)獄條件的行為進(jìn)行了嚴(yán)格限制。此外，該法還給予政府機(jī)構(gòu)終止某些同意令的權(quán)利；其中一些同意令已經(jīng)持續(xù)了數(shù)十年。

The federal courts have been criticized for using consent decrees to reform prison systems, school systems, and other government agencies. Some courts have maintained oversight of agencies for many years and have imposed conditions that have cost state and local governments substantial amounts of money. Congress intervened in one litigation area when it passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The law imposed strict limits on what federal courts could do in thefuture to improve prison conditions through the use of consent decrees. In addition, it gave government agencies the right to seek the termination of consent decrees, many of which had lasted for decades.

試題2（380words）

A civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law. Remedies intended to punish culpable individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation or restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law, not courts of equity. The action authorized by this Act is of this character.

民事罰款是一種只能在普通法法院得到執(zhí)行的普通法救濟(jì)方式。與那些僅僅旨在獲取賠償或恢復(fù)原狀的救濟(jì)手段不同，意在懲罰當(dāng)罰之人的救濟(jì)由普通法法院而非衡平法法院做出。本法所授權(quán)的訴訟就具有這種特征。

本法并沒(méi)有要求計(jì)算（法院所）施加的“民事罰款”時(shí)，單純考量衡平因素，比如違法所得利潤(rùn)；而是僅規(guī)定了違法處罰上限——每日處罰額不得超過(guò)10,000美元。本法的立法史表明，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦國(guó)會(huì)要求，聯(lián)邦地區(qū)法院在施加民事罰款時(shí)，應(yīng)當(dāng)考慮在恢復(fù)原狀之外進(jìn)行懲罰和阻卻的必要性。法院可以基于如下因素對(duì)不當(dāng)行為進(jìn)行懲罰，即：違法的嚴(yán)重性、之前的違法次數(shù)，以及在遵守相關(guān)的（行政）要求方面缺乏付諸努力的誠(chéng)意。法院可以基于罰款可能產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響，尋求達(dá)到阻卻未來(lái)違法行為發(fā)生的目的。本法授權(quán)處罰以進(jìn)一步懲罰或阻卻（不當(dāng)行為）的規(guī)定清楚地表明，本款所反映的不僅僅是對(duì)提供衡平救濟(jì)的關(guān)注。

This Act does not direct that the“civil penalty” imposed be calculated solely on the basis of equitable determinations, such as the profits gained from violations of the statutes, but simply imposes a maximum penalty of $10,000 per day of violation. The legislative history of the Act reveals that United States Congress wanted the district court to consider the need for retribution and deterrence, in addition to restitution, when it imposed civil penalties. A court can require retribution for wrongful conduct based on the seriousness of the violations, the number of prior violations, and the lack of good-faith efforts to comply with the relevant requirements. It may alsoseek to deter future violations by basing the penalty on its economic impact. This Act’s authorization of punishment to further retribution and deterrence clearly evidences that this subsection re fl ects more than a concern to provide equitable relief.

In the present case, for instance, the district court acknowledged that petitioner received no profits, but still imposed a $35,000 fine. Thus, the district court intended not simply to disgorge profits but also to impose punishment. Because the nature of the relief authorized by this Act was traditionally available only in a court of law, petitioner in this present action is entitled to a jury trial on demand.

例如，在本案中，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦地區(qū)法院承認(rèn)，申請(qǐng)人并沒(méi)有獲得利益，但仍對(duì)其處以35,000美元的罰款。因此，聯(lián)邦地區(qū)法院不僅希望追繳利潤(rùn)，還要對(duì)其施加懲罰。由于本法授權(quán)的救濟(jì)類型歷來(lái)只能在普通法法院獲得，本案中的申請(qǐng)人有權(quán)要求進(jìn)行陪審團(tuán)審理。

The punitive nature of the relief sought in this present case is made apparent by a comparison with the relief sought in an action to abate a public nuisance. A public nuisance action was a classic example of the kind of suit that relied on the injunctive relief provided by courts in equity. Injunctive relief for enjoining a public nuisance at the request of the Government is traditionally given by equity upon a showing of peril to health and safety. The Government, in fact, concedes that public nuisance cases brought in equity sought injunctive relief, not monetary penalties. Indeed, courts in equity refused to enforce such penalties.

通過(guò)與消除公共妨害訴訟所尋求的救濟(jì)方式比較，本案所尋求救濟(jì)的懲罰性質(zhì)一目了然。公共妨害訴訟是依賴衡平法法院提供禁令救濟(jì)的一種典型訴訟類型。通常，衡平法法院應(yīng)政府請(qǐng)求簽發(fā)禁止公共妨害之令，需表明存在潛在的健康和安全危險(xiǎn)。政府實(shí)際上也承認(rèn)，在衡平法法院提起的公共妨害之訴，尋求的是禁令救濟(jì)，而非金錢處罰。的確，衡平法法院拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行此類處罰。

試題3（393words）

Although the idea of “degrees of negligence” has not been without its advocates, it has been condemned by most writers, and, except in bailment cases, rejected at common law by most courts, as a distinction “vague and impracticable in its nature, so unfounded in principle,” that it adds only difficulty and confusion to the already nebulous and uncertain standards which must be given to the jury. The prevailing rule in most situations is that there are no “degrees”of care or negligence, as a matter of law; there are only different amounts of care, as a matter of fact. The dif fi culty of classification, because of the very real difficulty of drawing satisfactory lines of demarcation, together with the unhappy history, justifies the rejection of the distinctions in most situations.

The skepticism of Prosser and Keeton about the ability of judges, juries, and commentators to intelligibly apply different degrees of negligence was preceded a century and a half ago by the United States Supreme Court. In the 1853 admiralty personal injury case (arising from an exploding boiler on a vessel), the Court complained about the distinctions claimed for classifying negligence into categories:

“過(guò)失程度”之觀點(diǎn)雖不乏擁躉，但已被大多數(shù)作者所詬病。并且，除了委托保管案件之外，大多數(shù)法院已拒絕承認(rèn)它屬于普通法（的范疇），其原因在于：這種區(qū)分，“在性質(zhì)上是模糊且不可行的，在原則上是如此地缺乏根據(jù)”；在必須給予陪審團(tuán)的、業(yè)已模糊且不確定的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)之上平添困難和疑惑。大多數(shù)情況下適用的主要規(guī)則是，在法律上，并不存在注意（義務(wù)）或過(guò)失的“程度”之分；事實(shí)上，僅有不同量的注意（義務(wù)）。因?yàn)榇_實(shí)很難做出令人滿意的劃分，加之其不如意的適用歷史，使得這樣的分類非常困難，這也是絕大多數(shù)案件中將之摒棄的原因。

普洛賽教授和基頓教授對(duì)法官、陪審團(tuán)和評(píng)論法學(xué)者明辨不同過(guò)失程度的能力的質(zhì)疑，早在一個(gè)半世紀(jì)之前，就出現(xiàn)在美國(guó)聯(lián)邦最高法院。1853年，在一起因船舶鍋爐爆炸所導(dǎo)致的人身傷害海事案件中，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦最高法院就對(duì)要求區(qū)分過(guò)失類型的主張表示不滿：

這一從部分羅馬法評(píng)論法學(xué)家處引入普通法的理論認(rèn)為存在三種不同程度的過(guò)失，分別用術(shù)語(yǔ)“輕微過(guò)失”“一般過(guò)失”“重大過(guò)失”來(lái)界定。上述術(shù)語(yǔ)能否在實(shí)踐中得到有效地適用，值得懷疑。它們的含義并不明確，或是無(wú)法明確。因此，所謂的某一程度的過(guò)失，不僅可能與其他程度的過(guò)失相混淆，在實(shí)踐中也難以被準(zhǔn)確地區(qū)分。在不同的環(huán)境下，它們的含義也必然發(fā)生變化；法院也被迫受制于這些變化的影響，以至于現(xiàn)實(shí)中存在著如此之多的例外情形，導(dǎo)致這些規(guī)則很難有一種通行操作方式。

The theory that there are three degrees of negligence, described bythe terms slight, ordinary, and gross, has been introduced into the common law from some of the commentators on the Roman law. It may be doubted if these terms can be usefully applied in practice. Their meaning is not fi xed, or capable of being so. One degree, thus described, not only may be confounded with another, but it is quite impracticable exactly to distinguish them. Their signi fi cation necessarily varies according to circumstances, to whose in fl uence the courts have been forced to yield, until there are so many real exceptions that the rules themselves can scarcely be said to have a general operation.

The Court commented that if the law furnished no practically applicable de fi nition of the terms “gross negligence”or “ordinary negligence,” but left it to the jury to determine in each case what the duty was, and what omissions amount to a breach of it, “it would seem that imperfect and confessedly unsuccessful attempts to define that duty, had better be abandoned.” Whatever test might be used, the Court said there was gross negligence in the failure to use proper skill in the management of the boilers on the vessel.

美國(guó)聯(lián)邦最高法院的評(píng)論如下：如果法律不能提供在實(shí)踐中可以適用的“重大過(guò)失”或“一般過(guò)失”的定義，而是將其留給陪審團(tuán)在個(gè)案中決定何謂義務(wù)，何種不作為構(gòu)成違反義務(wù)，“那么，這種界定義務(wù)的嘗試是存在缺陷的，顯然不能成功，最好予以廢棄”。聯(lián)邦最高法院稱，不論使用何種檢驗(yàn)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，對(duì)于沒(méi)有使用合理的技能去管理船舶鍋爐這一情形，均構(gòu)成重大過(guò)失。

1執(zhí)筆人：李明倩博士，1984年生，河北唐山人，法學(xué)博士。研究方向：法律翻譯、法律史。參與譯文定稿的包括：華東政法大學(xué)外語(yǔ)學(xué)院院長(zhǎng)屈文生教授、余素青教授、伍巧芳教授、馬莉教授、張朱平副教授、朱麗芳副教授、甘翠平博士、宋麗玨博士，山東大學(xué)法學(xué)院院長(zhǎng)沈偉教授，上海政法學(xué)院國(guó)際交流學(xué)院院長(zhǎng)歐陽(yáng)美和教授。特別致謝上海交通大學(xué)鄭戈教授對(duì)譯文的審閱與指導(dǎo)。